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I. Introduction 
 
When John Roberts acceded to the position of Chief Justice of the United States, 
he stated that one of his top priorities was to reduce the number of dissenting opinions 
issued by members of the Court.1 Roberts believes dissent is a symptom of dysfunction.2 
This belief is shared with many justices past and present, the most famous of which is 
his predecessor John Marshall, who squelched virtually all dissent during his 35 years as 
Chief Justice.3 One of their arguments is that dissent weakens the Court by exposing 
internal divisions publicly.4 The Court would be better, perhaps more efficient at 
deciding cases and making law, if it spoke with one voice. This is a common refrain in 
American constitutional history. Justice Louis Brandeis famously wrote that “[i]t is 
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right,” 
stating that he would join opinions he disagreed with just for the sake of settling the 
law.5 Other justices have called dissents “subversive literature”6 and “useless” 7, and, we 
presume, acted just like Brandeis.  
Another reason for the hostility to dissent is the concern that allowing dissent 
means the majority is free to be bolder in its decision, since it is not forced to 
compromise. In a recent speech at Georgetown Law School, Chief Justice Roberts stated 
the ground for this claim: "Division should not be artificially suppressed, but the rule of 
law benefits from a broader agreement. The broader the agreement among the justices, 
                                                
∗ University of Chicago Law School. Thank you to the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Microsoft 
Corporation, the George J. Phocas Fund, and the John M. Olin Foundation for research support. Geoffrey 
Stone, Martha Nussbaum, Judge Richard Posner, and Alison LaCroix gave many helpful comments. Ali 
Beyer and Jason Lawrence provided research support. 
1 See Hope Yen, Roberts Seeks Greater Consensus on Court, WASH. POST, May 21, 2006, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/21/AR2006052100678.html; see 
also, Chief Justice John Roberts, Address to Georgetown University Class of 2006 (May 21, 2006) 
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=144. 
2 See Address to Georgetown University, Class of 2006, supra note 1. 
3 See Part III.C. infra. As discussed below, Marshall used leadership, example, and other 
techniques to discourage dissent and build a collegial and consensus Court. There was some dissent, but 
as shown herein, it was trivial. 
4 Learned Hand believed that dissent “cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the 
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.” LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).  
5 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
6 In an interview, Stewart characterized dissents in this way, quoting an unnamed law professor of 
his. See Robert Bendiner, The Law and Potter Stewart An Interview With Justice Potter Stewart, 
AMERICAN HERITAGE, available at 
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/ah/1983/1/1983_1_98.shtml (“Q: Isn’t it a matter 
of concern, then, that the government should tempt people into committing an offense? 
A: It’s a matter of great concern to me. I wrote a dissenting opinion in a similar case, but it was a 
dissenting opinion, and when I went to law school we had a professor who said dissenting opinions are 
nothing but subversive literature.”). 
7 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (opinion of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the “Great Dissenter”). 
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the more likely it is a decision on the narrowest possible grounds."8 Of course, this does 
not tell us the why, only the how. We can guess that the why has something to do with 
Bickel’s “passive virtues” and Sunstein’s one-case-at-a-time minimalism, with an eye 
toward sharing with, or even delegating to, others decision-making power over 
controversial social issues. Whatever the reason, Roberts, like Marshall before him, 
believes that changing the nature of the judicial opinions released to the public—the 
discourse of law—is how to achieve his unstated goals. 
To other past and present justices, most famously Chief Justice Stone and Justice 
William Brennan, dissent is considered a healthy, and even necessary, practice that 
improves the way in which law is made.9 We get better law, ceteris paribus, with dissent 
than without.10 Their counter-position rests in part on two ideas: first, dissents 
communicate legal theories to other justices, lawyers and political actors, state courts, 
and future justices, and have sometimes turned into good law later on as a result of this; 
and second, dissents are essential to reveal the deliberative nature of the Court, which in 
turn improves its institutional authority and legitimacy within American governance. 
Justice Brennan describes the first idea as justices “contributing to the marketplace of 
competing ideas” in an attempt to get at the truth or right answer.11 Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes captured this latter point when he observed that dissent, when a 
matter of conviction, is needed “because what must ultimately sustain the court in 
public confidence is the character and independence of the judges.”12 Dissent, in this 
interpretation, is essential to getting the best possible legal rule and ensuring the Court’s 
legitimacy. 
So who is right? Is dissent a symptom of a dysfunctional Court or of a healthy 
one? Is dissent essential to getting the best possible legal rule or is it likely to lead to 
murky or bad legal rules? History tells us a little bit. We observe that throughout its 
history the Supreme Court has sometimes issued predominantly unanimous opinions, 
while at other times issued separate opinions in most cases. Since the trend is toward 
the latter, one conclusion might be that there has been learning and evolution—that the 
practice today is better in some sense than the practice in the past. In other words, 
judicial opinions have moved toward a more efficient method of deciding and 
announcing legal rules. 
The almost thousand-year history of separate opinions by English courts gives us 
reason to doubt this. Another possibility is that Court practices are tailored to the 
particular times, and that what was the best method then is not the best method today. 
                                                
8 See Hope, supra note 1. 
9 See William J. Brennan Jr, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L. J. 427, 438 (1986) (defending 
dissents on multiple grounds and calling dissent a “duty”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a 
Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L. REV. 1185 (1992) (presenting several arguments justifying the current practice 
of frequent dissenting opinions); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. 
REV. 133 (1990) (same).  
10 Cass Sunstein makes a more general case for the value of dissent in all aspects of decision-
making in a recent book. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT  210-11 (2006) 
(“Organizations and nations are far more likely to prosper if they welcome dissent and promote 
openness.”). 
11 Brennan Jr, supra note 9 at 438 (“Through dynamic interaction among members of the present 
Court and through dialogue across time with the future Court, we ensure the continuing contemporary 
relevance and hence vitality of the principles of our fundamental charter.”). 
12 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTIED STATES 67-68 (1928). 
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If we believe this and we want to understand the practice of dissent, then we must ask 
what is it about the times in question that leads to this result. If true, we might also 
think that Chief Justice Roberts’s proposal is wrongheaded, since it would be trying to 
fit the square peg of unanimity into the round hole of modern cases and controversies.  
This paper argues that there is no abstract answer to the question of how courts 
should decide cases or deliver opinions. Issuing majority and dissenting opinions is not 
a natural condition or even the most effective, efficient, or rational system for making 
law. Moreover, the elimination of dissents would not move the Court in the direction of 
a more efficient or perfected state of discourse. Instead, the style of appellate discourse 
reflects the power-accumulating tendencies of courts and the law generally. There is in 
fact no neutrally efficient answer to the question of how courts should communicate the 
results of cases and controversies with litigants, the bar, and the public at large. Style 
reflects power, and the Court’s choice of style is about the Court’s power.  
This is not a new idea in philosophy: Michel Foucault and others tell us that truth 
is not determined in a vacuum, but rather is revealed only through an exercise of 
power.13 So too here. The Court has no army, no guns, no bureaucrats to enforce its will, 
so its power must come from somewhere else.14 We must find this source of power in the 
only place where the Court communicates with those on the outside—its opinions.15 The 
content of opinions is obviously an essential element of this power, but this paper argues 
that so is the style or manner in which they are issued. And since decisions are an 
exercise of power, we should expect the manner in which the Court communicates 
decisions to reflect the Court’s power.16 In other words, the presence or absence of 
separate opinions does not arise from a state of nature, but depends on the particular 
goals or objectives of the Court.17  
To test this hypothesis, this paper briefly examines the history of dissent.18 It 
shows that the manner in which appellate law is made has been changed several times 
throughout Anglo-American legal history in an attempt to increase the power of law 
courts over other forms of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court, and its predecessors 
in England, sometimes issued dissents and sometimes spoke largely with one voice. In 
                                                
13 Here I draw on Foucault’s “power/knowledge” dynamic. See MICHEL FOUCAULT 
POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (1980) [hereinafter 
POWER/KNOWLEDGE]. 
14 HAND supra note 4. 
15 The power of the Supreme Court manifests itself in many forms, including in structural prestige 
and the reputation of individual justices, but is expressed through only one form: the written legal 
opinion. 
16 As is the case for automobiles, architecture, toothbrushes, and most other things in life, for legal 
opinions, form follows function. Architect Louis Sullivan of the Chicago School made the phrase “form 
follows function” famous by christening a new style of architecture for sky scrapers that emphasized 
exposing the structural realities of buildings instead of hiding them behind adornments. See Louis 
Sullivan, The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered, LIPPINCOTT'S MAGAZINE, Mar. 1896.  
17 This raises the obvious question of how we can speak of the goals and objectives of “the Court” 
when it is composed of individuals and when we normally don’t think of multi-member bodies in this way. 
The idea here is that the Court is just a proxy for the overall sociological and subconscious forces at work. 
18 Foucault would call this a “genealogical” study of dissent. Genealogy is the process of looking to 
the past for an explanation or greater understanding or appreciation of the present. By looking at the 
reasons (underlying or overt) dissent is encouraged, tolerated, or squashed at a given time by courts, 
genealogy may provide us with the perspective to call the conventional wisdom about dissent into 
question.  
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each case, the choice about which style was used was made with an eye toward bringing 
more business or more interesting business or more influential business to the court. A 
specific change in the delivery of opinions designed to achieve precisely this purpose—
increasing the power of “Law”—has happened at least three times on a grand scale: (1) 
the change from traditional seriatim opinions to an “opinion of the court” in England 
circa 1760; (2) a similar change in the United States Supreme Court upon the 
ascendancy of John Marshall to Chief Justice in 1801; and (3) the development of a 
tradition of writing separately during the New Deal era of the Supreme Court, which has 
persisted to the present.19 In each of these examples, the change of discourse was a pure 
power-play designed to increase the role of law in shaping the norms of society. 
England’s abandonment of seriatim opinions was designed to increase the reach of law 
into the regulation of commercial activity; the Supreme Court’s similar change in the era 
of Marshall was intended to increase the role of the Court generally and to assert the 
judiciary as an equivalent branch in the fledgling days of American democracy; and the 
rise of dissent in the Court was necessary to expand the influence of the Court and Law 
in deciding disputes previously or possibly addressed by other, extra-judicial means.  
Those seeking to control “truth” in each case, used a change in discourse to 
achieve power within their society for themselves, their class, or their group.20 For 
example, as shown below, the current practice of issuing frequent dissenting opinions in 
the Supreme Court flourishes in order for the Court to legitimately exercise dominion 
over controversial social or political disputes, such as reproductive rights, racial 
equality, and public safety, that otherwise might be handled by extrajudicial means. 
Imagine the potential political reaction to a unanimous and anonymous opinion on the 
abortion issue, and one gets an idea of how important dissent is at keeping controversial 
issues on the Court’s docket. In other words, dissent is merely one of the tools that allow 
the Supreme Court to stay in the business it is in or to extend its power into new areas.21 
This does not necessarily mean that there were explicit or even conscious plans by those 
making the change. The Court and the individual justices did not plan or necessarily 
intend the consequence, but it may be the result of sociological forces beyond their ken. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explores the relation between 
discourse and power, and how this impacts our conceptions of truth. The goal is to put 
the opinion delivery practices of the Supreme Court in the context of its larger role in 
formulating the legal framework through which truth in our society is determined. 
                                                
 19 The evolution of appellate discourse may be roughly analogous to the theory of “punctuated 
equilibrium” in evolutionary biology. See Niles Eldredge & Stephen Jay Gould, Punctuated equilibria: an 
alternative to phyletic gradualism, in T.J.M. SCHOPF, ED., MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY, 82-115 (1985). 
Changes in style, tone, approach, length, etc. occur gradually over the years, and then there is a sudden 
change precipitates a dramatic reordering of the predominate discourse. In this view, the changes of 
Mansfield and Marshall were the legal equivalents of the asteroids that destroyed the dinosaurs and the 
trilobites. The theory has been applied in the public policy context. See Frank Baumgartner, et al., The 
Destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress. 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 673 (1993) (showing that government 
policies in some areas are characterized by long periods of stability, and are disrupted occasional but rare 
shocks). 
20 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 29 (2d ed. 1985) (“In modern times, law 
is an instrument; the people in power use it to push or pull toward some definite goal.”). 
21 Id. at 18 (“If the courts . . . are hidebound and ineffective, that merely means some other agency 
has taken over what courts might otherwise do.”); id. at 114 (“[L]aw had to suit the needs of its 
customers.”). 
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Section III builds on this foundation by examining the Anglo-American history of 
dissenting opinions. The takeaway here is that dissent and unanimity norms are merely 
tools that are used to increase the power of the Court and law in general in our society. 
Section IV describes current opinion delivery practices, focusing on the change from the 
Rehnquist to Roberts Court. In light of the case made in Section III, Roberts’s desire to 
move the Court toward unanimity might be seen as a countermove in this historical 
vector of more power for courts and law. His discursive move, which doesn’t appear to 
be working, is also about the Court’s power, but it may be about decreasing the Court’s 
power. Although somewhat unique in the history of the Court, his attempt to 
deemphasize the Court’s role in social disputes appears to be consistent with his 
jurisprudential philosophy. Here again, we see that discourse is power, whether for 
greater or lesser. Section V concludes. 
 
II. Discourse, Power & Truth 
 
Law is to a great extent what judges say it is,22 and how they say it, is one of the 
primary sources of legal power over society. In our society law is often synonymous with 
power, and it greatly influences the pursuit of “truth”.23 Not only do laws define the 
locus of acceptable conduct within society, but they also set the framework in which 
truth is determined. Whether it is the veracity of a litigant’s claim at a trial or the 
possible impact of a business merger on consumer well being, law establishes the rules 
whereby competing claims of truth are weighed. This was not always the case. In other 
societies, at other times, various forms of truth existed outside or above the law. 
Religion or magic often was the source.24 Law has displaced these forces so that “the 
characteristic of our Western societies [is] that the language of power is law.”25 
But the law does much more than this. Law constructs much of modern 
discourse, since it authorizes some to speak and some views to be taken seriously, while 
others are marginalized, derided, excluded, or even prohibited. The law creates 
discourse that affects all citizens through the creation of “episteme”—historically 
enduring discursive regularities that act as perception grids within which thought, 
communication, and action can occur. These take the form of much more than enabling 
other state or individual actions. For example, court rules, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the delivery of opinions are all legal 
“grids” within which truth is produced. In other words, discourses generate truth. 
Foucault writes that: 
                                                
22 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961) (“A supreme tribunal has the last word in saying 
what the law is and, when it has said it, the statement that the court was ‘wrong’ has no consequences 
within the system: no one's rights or duties are thereby altered.”). 
23 Here we see the intuition of Max Weber, whose famous speech to Munich University students, 
Politics as a Vocation, introduced the concept that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical violence. See DANIEL WARNER, AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 9-10 
(1991).  
24 It is well known that religious or pseudo-religious entities have historically been rivals of law. 
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 52, 65 (“[C]hurches . . . worked . . . as rivals of courts.”). In England, 
this tradition survived well into the 19th Century, and it is arguably still true in some advanced nations, 
and definitely true in other societies. See id. at 202 (“In England [in the 1800’s], ecclesiastical courts had 
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and the church had an important role in family law.”). 
25 FOUCAULT, supra note 13 at 201. 
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Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of 
truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true.26 
 
Law is the “general politics” of the modern era, and legal opinions are the fundamental 
discourse of this politics. Initially, individual lower courts and judges establish the rules 
for how the truth will be determined in a particular case. Then appellate courts act as an 
additional guardian of a particular form of truth by acting as a normalizing influence 
over the lower courts. Lower courts may act in a variety of ways, but appellate courts 
supervise this conduct and issue opinions primarily to normalize the conduct of lower 
courts. In turn, the Supreme Court fills this same normalization role vis-à-vis the 
appellate courts. Whereas lower courts may develop various rules and procedures if left 
alone, with appellate supervision the result is the creation of a more regularized and 
more legalized form of truth.27  
Appellate judges determine the boundaries of what is proper and improper for 
individuals in particular cases, for lower courts, and for the practice of law in general.28 
This legal grid is not usually transparent or obvious to the lay public, but nevertheless, it 
is the locus of acceptable legal behavior within which society is required to function. 
Things or actions inside this set of behaviors are accepted as true and proper, while 
those outside are punished. This is true not only for specific legal rules (for example, 
briefs submitted within a set period of days are accepted, those outside are not), but also 
for our society more broadly (for example, burning a flag is protected “speech,” while 
burning a cross is generally not).29 In other words, judges—and especially appellate 
                                                
26 Id. at 131. 
27 This concept of “truth” is divergent from any conventional definition. Historically the word 
“truth” was synonymous with “fact” or “actuality.” In this traditional world, truth is neutral and reveals 
itself only when the corrupting forces of power are absent. Perhaps this understanding of truth explains 
why for most of Anglo-American history legal judgments were made in public, openly and 
extemporaneously by each judge, where there was no possibility of “backroom dealing.” This type of 
discourse was used under the guise of trying to avoid (or show) the influence or coercion of power. But 
truth cannot exist independently of power. In the police station, the courtroom, the state house, the 
workplace, and throughout modern society, law is the power that enables the production of knowledge 
and the determination of truth.  
28 The law does more than allow truth to be revealed in a certain way. Law is one of the most 
powerful discourses in that it claims not only to reveal the truth, like science, but also to consecrate it as 
the Law, the sole source of legitimate physical power. In this context, an appellate opinion is a source of 
truth and a representation of power, not so much as an evaluation of the “facts” of a particular case, but 
rather what “facts” are acceptable within the legal grid that the court creates. It is up to the lower courts to 
determine the truth, but the appellate court enables the truth to be discovered in a particular way.  
29 This is not exactly correct. Burning a cross and burning a flag are both protected to some extent; 
what differentiates the treatment of these two acts of speech is the existence of threat in the former case. 
Cross burning can be prohibited only when it is a threat. In theory, the state could prohibit flag burning if 
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judges—determine what is normal and what is abnormal in our society in subjects 
ranging far beyond the narrow world of the courtroom. In this way, law is a normalizing 
force and a judicial opinion is a normalizing act.30  
Appellate opinions achieve this role of normalization in several ways. First and 
foremost, the opinion seals the fate of the parties before the court and establishes a 
precedent for other individual actors in future cases. In addition, the opinion delineates 
the bounds of acceptable reasoning for lower courts. This control is exercised not only 
over the final decision of a lesser court, but also over details of procedure, including 
what evidence may be admitted, what witnesses may testify, and what judges and juries 
may consider as proper in deciding the case. Finally, the opinion will set the broad 
boundaries of acceptable legal conduct and argument: law students learn by reading 
appellate opinions; lawyers plan cases and strategies by studying appellate opinions; 
and judges decide law by following the precedent or argument of previous appellate 
opinions. The content, the structure, and the tone of judicial opinions influence all these 
players in the practice of law. In other words, a court determines the scope of its own 
authority through its discourse. 
This discourse among litigants, judges, lawyers, academics, students, and the 
public is greatly influenced by the manner in which appellate opinions are issued. The 
greatest influence on this discourse is the presence or absence of separate opinions from 
the official decision issued by the court as a whole. There are many ways of deciding and 
announcing the result of a legal dispute: there could be a collection of opinions from 
each judge without an opinion of the court as a whole (seriatim opinions, as was the 
tradition in England for hundreds of years); there could be a single unsigned opinion 
with no permitted dissent (unanimous, per curiam opinions issued without a public 
vote, as is the current practice in civil law countries such as Germany and France)31; or 
there could be an opinion of a majority of the judges (either signed or unsigned) along 
with any concurring or dissenting opinions (as is primarily the practice in American 
federal and state courts).32  
The structure of appellate opinions is an integral part of the creation of legal truth 
grids. A unanimous opinion (9-0) by the Supreme Court will foster a much different 
reaction than a 5-4 decision with several scathing dissents. Unanimous opinions will 
settle the law. Although lower courts may try to carve out small areas of disagreement 
within the legal grid, the message of the Court is that this issue is decided absolutely and 
will not be subject to reconsideration any time soon. No foreseeable changes in Court 
personnel or attitude are likely to change the votes of five justices. By contrast an 
opinion that carries the vote by only one justice will send quite a different message to 
lower courts and to lawyers who may wish to challenge the precedent. Challenges will be 
fruitful when changes in Court membership make the vote uncertain or when a 
                                                                                                                                                       
it was viewed as a threat, but this is much more difficult to imagine. The end result in most cases will be 
that burning a flag is OK, while burning a cross is not.  
30 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 187-92 (1975) (using hospitals as a prototypical 
example of the growth of normalization through record keeping and other forms of documentary power).  
31 Continental law (and the law in Japan, China, and other non-Anglo-American countries) is not 
made by judges but is contained mostly in written statutory codes. In the common law system, in contrast, 
a great deal of law is made by the opinions of judges. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 22. 
32 For an analysis of the difference between these styles, see Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial 
Voice, supra note 9 at 67; Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, supra note 9 at 133. 
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compelling case comes along that may force one or two justices to reconsider their vote. 
Therefore, dissenting opinions are more likely to create some uncertainty in the law. 
This uncertainty will produce a much different process for determining “truth.”33 
The resulting discourse – be it ambiguous, disputed, apparently unassailable, or 
obscure – determines, or at least greatly influences, our conception of legal “knowledge” 
and the determination of legal “truth.” As a result, this apparently simple feature of 
appellate opinions can in actuality shape the very foundations of a society. Throughout 
history the process of deciding cases, of establishing how the “truth” will be determined, 
has changed, and with it the legal discourse has changed. Seriatim opinions were 
common at certain times and in certain nations, while unanimous opinions dominated 
at other times or in certain countries or legal systems. But what determines the shape of 
appellate discourse and why do we see different types of discourse at different times and 
across different societies? 
 
III. A Brief History of Dissent 
 
There are only three widely used ways in which multi-judge courts have delivered 
judicial decisions over nearly a thousand of years of recorded Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. The first is the seriatim delivery of the judgment of each judge 
individually and one after another with the grounds for the decision (known as 
“seratim”). This practice prevailed in Great Britain for nearly all of its history, from the 
time of William the Conqueror to present day. It also was common in U.S. courts (both 
state and federal) at the Founding. The second is delivering an “opinion of the court” as 
a whole, with no publicly revealed vote or separate opinions issued by individual judges. 
This practice has been used at least two times, by chief judges Lord Mansfield of the 
King’s Bench in England and (more or less) John Marshall of the United States Supreme 
Court. Finally, the modern practice in the United States is a hybrid, in which an opinion 
of a majority of the court is issued, but judges decide individually whether to “write 
separately”. This section traces the historical development of these three models briefly 
to search for explanations for their use. 
 
A. The English Experience 
 
From almost a thousand years, decisions of multi-member courts in England 
were delivered orally by each judge seriatim and without any prior intra-court 
consultation.34 The opinions, the sum of which would amount to the legal rule in the 
case, were not even published by the court or the judges until the early Seventeenth 
Century. Prior to that time, case reports were compiled by “prothonotaries” or scribes,35 
who recorded, to the best of their ability, the proceedings of the court and the orally 
delivered opinions of the judges. These reports, covering a continuous period from the 
reigns of King Edward I to Henry VIII (1268 to 1535), were originally published in raw 
form, and were used by lawyers as source material and precedent. The unedited and 
                                                
33 This analysis is true, of course, only in a legal system in which judges express their differences 
in public through concurring and dissenting opinions. In France and Germany, all opinions carry the 
same discursive impact because disagreement is not published. 
34 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 40 (2d ed. 2001). 
35 In some accounts, scribes were law students, and the recordation process was their education. 
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unabridged compilations were massive and in no sense portrayed a coherent picture of 
the law. Lawyers and judges had a difficult time even figuring out what the legal rule 
from a case was.36 “Precedent” was virtually unknown, since it implies the existence of a 
stable of judgments available to parties and judges. Abridgements of leading cases 
appeared by the late Fifteenth Century,37 but the quality varied tremendously, and no 
official court reports were issued until Edward Coke published his cases in 1609.38 The 
“poverty of the law reports,” as C.H.S. Fifoot writes, contributed to the lack of clarity of 
the law.39 This had many bad effects, but, as shown below, the lack of clarity did not 
become a crisis until the rise of commerce in the mid-Seventeenth Century. 
 Even after Coke and his contemporaries formulated the issuance of official 
reports of judicial decisions, the practice of each judge delivering his opinion seriatim 
continued. Although undoubtedly tradition and a sense of its efficiency sustained this 
practice, we can only speculate as to its origins. One possibility is concern about 
concealed power. Oral delivery by each individual judge may be a more accountable 
method of deciding cases than decisions made in seclusion, since judgments made in the 
open and without prior discussion may be less likely to be (or appear to be) infected by 
corruption or collusion or the influence of the monarch. As critics complained after 
certain American courts departed from the seriatim tradition, forcing individual judges 
to give their account provided a basis to hold judges accountable, which in turn gave 
them an incentive to work hard and do well.40 
The long and unbroken tradition of delivering opinions seriatim was changed 
unilaterally with the ascendancy of William Murray, known as “Lord Mansfield”, to the 
position of Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1756.41 Mansfield introduced a 
procedure for generating agreement and consensus among judges and then issuing 
                                                
36 William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century 
(when reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that 
the cases are generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business, 
and very often draw general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which 
weighed with the court in the determination of these cases.” JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE 
AGE OF MANSFIELD 366 (2004).  
37 The first abridgment was made by Nicholas Statham, Baron of the Exchequer under Edward IV, 
in around 1470. 8 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERATURE, Chapter XIII sec. 9, 
(1907) (“As the number of the Year Books increased, it became convenient to make classified abridgments 
of their leading cases. The first of these was made, about 1470, by Nicholas Statham, baron of the 
exchequer under Edward IV.”).  
38 Edward Coke, who served as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and then the King’s 
Bench, became the first English jurist to publish his opinions in 1609. His cases became Volume I of the 
English Reports. 
39 See CECIL H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 89 (1936). 
40 See infra notes 93-109 and surrounding text. Thomas Jefferson, a strong critic of the “opinion 
of the court”, wrote: “An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if 
unanimous, and with the silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, who 
sophisticates the law to his own mind, by the turn of his own reasoning.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169, 171 (Paul L. Ford ed., 
1899). 
41 Murray served as Lord Chief Justice from 1756 to 1788. The King’s Bench was one of three 
common law courts in England at the time. Although there were rival courts of various royal and non-
royal statures, the King’s Bench was the most important common law court in the land. Appeals were 
possible but largely unknown, and therefore the King’s Bench had the ultimate say in most matters, 
especially those of a commercial nature. 
10  /  Henderson 
caucused opinions. The judges met collectively in the secrecy of their chambers, worked 
out their differences into a compromise decision, and then wrote what was to be 
delivered as an anonymous and unanimous “opinion of the court”. Mansfield made this 
dramatic change in an attempt to bring clarity to the law in order to bring English 
commercial law in line with prevailing practices in trades and in other countries.42 He 
succeeded. Jim Oldham, the world’s leading Mansfield scholar, summarizes his 
accomplishment: “[Mansfield] established the basic principles that continue to govern 
the mercantile energies of England and America down to the present day.”43 
During the Middle Ages and until Mansfield, the law governing business affairs—
known as “the law merchant”—was administered by special lay courts at “fairs” set up on 
trade routes, in trade centers, or that traveled across Europe.44 The law merchant was 
distinct from the body of common law since it was international in scope and based 
largely on trade-specific customs that were unique to the commercial setting. The law 
merchant consisted primarily of semi-codified customs that developed over the course 
of many years and many thousands of transactions.45 It also existed in various treaties or 
legal codes set out by scholars and merchants in trade centers, like Rhodes, Barcelona, 
or Visby.46  
In many cases, this customary law differed from the more structured formalities 
of English common law.47 For example, in certain periods, an action in contract in the 
King’s Court was permitted only on a written document “sealed by the party against 
whom the claim was made” while in fair courts this rule was generally waived.48 In 
general, the customs and practices of trades were the law of commerce on the Continent, 
while these were foreign to judges, juries, and judgments in English courts. As Lord 
Holt, who preceded Mansfield as chief justice, noted when describing why the “law” 
should be insulated from the influence of merchants: “no protagonist, however 
                                                
42 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 133. Mansfield recognized the importance of the law merchant, 
which was based largely on commercial customs in practice in some areas since the Middle Ages, and 
incorporated it into general rules of application within the larger common law.  
43  OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 10. 
44 EDMUND HEWARD, LORD MANSFIELD: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM MURRAY 1ST EARL OF MANSFIELD 
(1705-1793) LORD CHIEF JUSTICE FOR 32 YEARS 99 (Barry Rose 1979); FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 28 
(“There were many types of merchant courts, including the colorful courts of piepowder, a court of the 
fairs where merchants gathered.”). 
45 For a modern example, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (describing 
the private commercial law used by merchants in the cotton industry).  
46 In the famous case, Luke v. Lyde, Lord Mansfield cited to various laws of the sea, including 
Rhodian Laws, the Consolato del Mere (Barcelona), and the laws of Visby. See Bridget Murphy, Luke v. 
Lyde, 2003 AUCKLAND UNIV. L. REV. 2 (2003). 
47 Edward Coke, who preceded Lord Mansfield on the King’s Bench by 150 years, declared in 1608 
that “the Law Merchant is part of this realm”, see 1 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
182a (1648), but this did not mean that customary commercial law was fully incorporated into the 
common law or that common law courts stepped aside and let merchant courts settle disputes. A century 
and a half after Coke made this statement, the common law was largely ignorant and disrespectful of the 
Law Merchant. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Rules of Venue, and the Beginnings of the Commercial 
Jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 561-62 (1914) (“It was not till the common 
law obtained in Lord Mansfield a judge who was a master of [foreign writings on commercial customs] 
that the rules deducible from the many various commercial customs which had come before the courts 
were formed into a coherent system, and completely incorporated with the common law.”). 
48 See HEWARD, supra note 44 at 100-01. 
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influential, [should] be permitted to dictate the terms upon which his dispute should be 
resolved.”49 In this respect, England differed substantially from the continent of Europe, 
where trade guild law was well incorporated into the body of general law.50 As could be 
expected, this procedural difference made law courts less valuable for resolving 
commercial disputes. 
The unprecedented growth in trade and commerce during the Eighteenth 
Century made the usefulness of courts in settling commercial law disputes an especially 
acute problem. In the fifty years before Mansfield became chief justice and for the fifty 
years after, international commerce became essential to the success of England’s 
expanding empire.51 As Dr. Samuel Johnson noted in 1756, the same year Mansfield was 
called to the bench, “there was never from the earliest ages a time in which trade so 
much engaged the attention of mankind, or commercial gain was sought with such 
general emulation.”52 At this time “the place of the Law Merchant in English law was 
considerably unsettled . . . [because] very few general rules and principles had been 
established to which isolated decisions could be adjusted.”53 English courts were not 
viewed as being equipped to offer a valuable service to commercial parties. The 
inadequacy of common law courts is apparent from commentary by merchants at the 
time. One influential guide for merchants noted that “[t[he right dealing merchant doth 
not care how little he hath to do in the Common Law.”54 Others advocated the 
establishment of specialty courts, impugning the law courts for not understanding 
commercial issues and creating confusion with their opinions.55 
The divergence between formal and informal law, between common and 
commercial law, was a problem for law courts since their inadequacy simply pushed 
commercial disputes to other types of or forums for dispute resolution. Courts were, 
from the perspective of business interests, overly formal and out of touch with the 
reality of commerce. The growth of commercial transactions in number, size, and 
complexity also exacerbated the problem.56 As commerce became more demanding of 
law, the hodgepodge of courts (e.g., courts of law, courts of equity, law merchant courts, 
ecclesiastical courts, etc.) regulating commerce only added to the misfit between 
common law adjudication and the needs of business. This manifested itself in two ways.  
                                                
49 FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 9. 
50 See HEWARD, supra note 44 at 99-101. 
51 See P. MARSHALL, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1988) 53 (noting during the period 1697 to 1815 
exports increased much faster than population growth or economic growth as a whole).  
52 See FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 4. 
53 MURPHY, supra note 46 at 4. 
54 JOHN MARIUS, ADVICE CONCERNING BILLS OF EXCHANGE (Early English books On-line, Electronic 
Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999). 
55 JOHN D. CARY, AN ESSAY ON THE STATE OF ENGLAND IN RELATION TO ITS TRADE (Printed by W 
Bonny 1695, Early English books On-line, Electronic Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999) 
(advocating “Courts of Merchants... for the speedy deciding all differences relating to Sea Affairs, which 
are better ended by those who understand them, than they are in Westminster-Hall.”); see also JOSIAH 
CHILD, A DISCOURSE ABOUT TRADE (Printed by A Sowle 1689, Early English books On-line, Electronic 
Reproduction Ann Arbor, Michigan 1999) (“it is well if, after great expenses of time and money, we can 
make our own Counsel (being Common Lawyers) understand one half of our Case, we being amongst 
them as in a Foreign Country.”). 
56 For example, during the time when Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice the number of cases 
involving promissory notes or bills of exchange increased about 100 percent per year, over three times the 
increase in cases overall. HEWARD, supra note 44 at 53. 
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First, different courts made different rules, creating uncertainty for businesses. 
There were over 70 law “courts” operating in London in the late Eighteenth Century, 
and these were administered by almost 800 judges.57 Although this plethora of courts 
gave plaintiffs a wide range of options to find the best venue for their claim, the lack of a 
centralized or systematic reporting system made the mishmash of courts a nightmare 
for anyone looking for certain legal rules. Even with a modern database like Westlaw, 
English judges and litigants at the time would have had difficulty determining the rule 
for any particular case. The plight of businessmen planning their affairs without legal 
counsel would have been nearly hopeless.  
Even when we narrow the number of courts down to the most important ones,58 
this still leaves three—Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Kings’ Bench—all of which had 
overlapping jurisdiction.59 Decisions from these courts were not binding authority on 
other courts,60 meaning there were (at least) three relevant sources of legal precedents 
for any particular dispute. According to Oldham, “[t]he horizontal structure of the 
English general courts, with three common law courts, each court operating largely 
independently of the others, inhibited growth of the notion of binding precedent.”61 In 
addition, separate equity courts, specifically the Court of Chancery, existed as an 
alternative to law courts. Although these had limited jurisdiction, they were available for 
many commercial law disputes. To complicate matters, equity courts typically had even 
worse reporting than the law courts.62  
It is not surprising that these many courts competed with each other for business. 
They did so not only for the reputational benefits, but for cash, since judges were paid by 
the case.63 According to a recent study, the judges therefore had an incentive to rule in 
favor of plaintiffs, since they were the party that chose the venue in most common law 
cases.64 Plaintiffs also had an incentive to choose a venue that increased their prospects, 
                                                
57 See PATRICK COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS 383-88 (5th ed.) 
(describing 9 supreme courts, 4 ecclesiastical courts, 17 courts for the City of London, 8 courts for the City 
of Westminster, 14 courts for the part of the city lying in County of Middlesex, 8 courts in the Borough of 
Southwark, 18 courts for small debts, one court of oyer and terminer, 4 courts of general and quarter 
sessions of the peace, 10 courts for the police petty matters, and 5 corners’ courts. These were overseen by 
753 judges. Id. at 389. This does not include the innumerable merchants’ courts, private arbitration 
proceedings, and other methods for resolving disputes. 
58 These three courts were the primary source of the Common Law during this period, despite 
being responsible for only a small percentage of cases. See OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 12. 
59 These courts, comprised of four judges each, had overlapping jurisdiction, and therefore 
competed for cases. As Daniel Klerman argues in a recent paper, competition was fierce, since judges were 
paid by the case. See Daniel M. Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common 
Law (University of Southern California CLEO Research Paper No. C07-4 , March 2007), available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968701, (forthcoming). 
60 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 366 (“Decisions from another court would be looked to only as 
advisory or as a means of persuasion.”). 
61 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 365. 
62 William Murray, who practiced before the Court of Chancery in the mid-Eighteenth Century 
(when reporting was still poor in equity courts), wrote: “It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that 
the cases are generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who do not understand business, 
and very often draw general principles from a case, without attending to particular circumstances, which 
weighed with the court in the determination of these cases.” OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 366. 
63 See KLERMAN, supra note 59 at 9-11 (showing that fees paid to judges per case were substantial 
and sufficient to bias their decisions in favor of plaintiffs, who chose the venue) 
64 Id. 
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regardless of the impact on future cases, which could be brought in other courts. If a 
business wanted to enforce a contract without a sealed, written document, it could bring 
an action at a merchant fair instead filing a formal pleading with a law court. And if a 
business had an equitable action to bring—that a contract should be enforced despite 
technical defects for example—it would have to do so in Chancery, where this argument 
was allowed, as opposed to the law courts. In this way, the various “courts” of England at 
that time competed for the business of commercial dispute resolution. By making 
favorable rules or procedures, courts could attract more disputes to resolve (taking 
market share from competing courts) and perhaps encourage more suits due to reduced 
transaction costs (growing the pie).  
Second, even within a specific court jurisdiction, the use of seriatim opinions 
added a layer of unnecessary confusion to the opinions of that court. Instead of a binary 
win-loss character, opinions at the time were a collection of “for” and “against” 
arguments. To determine whether one had won or lost a case, and, more importantly 
what the rule of the case was and how strong the precedent was, it was necessary to 
count heads who had voted for a particular argument or line of reasoning. In complex 
commercial disputes, this was not an easy matter. Moreover, interpreting past cases to 
plan future arguments was also exceedingly complex given the plethora of opinions on 
every subject, and the often highly nuanced differences among them. Accordingly, 
during this period the law became much more “confusing and remote to merchants and 
businessmen.”65 Thus the nascent commercial law of England was uncertain, exactly the 
opposite of what businesses needed to thrive.  
From the perspective of Eighteenth Century merchants what was needed was 
someone or something to bring more certainty to commercial dealings, to simplify legal 
proceedings and to create a simple set of rules that could be applied to all transactions.66 
According to Mansfield, the law of business “ought not to depend on subtleties and 
niceties, but upon rules easily learned and easily retained because they are dictates of 
common sense . . ..”67  
From the perspective of courts what was needed was a way to bring the business 
of commercial regulation from other courts or bodies to law courts – i.e., to increase the 
market share that law courts had for commercial disputes.68 Mansfield’s strategy was to 
make the decisions of his court (i.e., his product) more attractive to potential litigants 
(i.e., potential customers). To do this, Mansfield adopted the best practices of 
competitors. He created a set of general principles based on the valuable services that 
rival courts offered business litigants. These general principles included the requirement 
of good faith (from equitable courts) and the use of trade custom (from the law 
merchant or fair courts). Mansfield believed that the international nature of commerce 
                                                
65 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 95. 
66 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 58 (“The merchant’s idea of a good legal system was one that was 
rational and efficient, conforming to his values and expectations – traits that neither lay justice neither 
the baroque extravagances of English procedure [at law courts] supplied.”). 
67 Hamilton v. Mendes, 2 Burr. 1214 (1761). 
68 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 18. Mansfield wanted not only to take cases from other courts, but 
also from the legislature. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 211 (1997) (describing Mansfield as engaged in a “project of defending . . . traditional 
modes of adjudication against the perceived vices of legislation.”). 
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meant that commercial law must be the “same all over the world”69 and that this meant 
England had to move its formal law in the direction of traditional practices in other 
countries. “He . . . encouraged the development of legal rules that would support a 
commercial economy that was increasingly dependent on paper credit and that was 
vigorously involved in international trade.”70 Related to this was his view that legal rules 
should be understood by those “who must obey [them]”.71 The normative underpinning 
of Mansfield’s revolution was certainty: “the great object in every branch of law, but 
especially in mercantile law, is certainty.”72 
But Mansfield needed a mechanism to deliver certainty. He found it in the 
“opinion of the court.” The reform of the common law of commerce was possible only 
with an assertion of judicial power through a united court speaking in a single voice. No 
longer would multiple courts and numerous judges produce different opinions subject to 
nuance and ambiguity. A single court would hear and decide the fundamental issues of 
commercial law; decide them once and for all without dispute or ambiguity, and provide 
the certainty and stability needed for commercial transactions.73 The new “truth” about 
commercial law could only be discovered by an exercise of power – the power to change 
the discourse of the law, to change the form to adapt to the new function.  
Mansfield’s success can be measured in several ways. For one, as a result of his 
legal innovations, Mansfield’s court flourished. Prior to Mansfield’s discursive change, 
very few commercial cases came before law courts such as the King’s Bench.74 As a result 
of the consolidation of power through the focusing of legal discourse, Mansfield created 
a forum that was conducive to handling commercial cases, and “business flowed into his 
court.”75 
The number of “commercial cases” handled by the King’s Bench increased more 
rapidly than the overall growth rate of the docket as a whole. For example, the number 
of commercial cases handled by the King’s Bench grew by 30 percentage points more 
than all other cases during Mansfield’s time on the bench.76 More specifically, the 
number of cases involving promissory notes, which are essential elements for 
international trade rose five fold from about 3 per year during the beginning of 
Mansfield’s tenure to about 15 per year at the end. Cases involving “bills of exchange” 
                                                
69 Pelly v. Royal Exchange Assurance Co., 1 Burr. 341, 347 (1757). 
70 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 365. 
71 Id. at 124. 
72 Milles v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 231, 232 (1779).  
73 Mansfield’s application of equitable principles to commercial disputes was extremely 
controversial. In fact, Mansfield’s successors – such as Kenyon, Thurlow, and Eldon – all opposed this 
reform, and it was not until 1873 that the Supreme Court of Judicature was established and endowed with 
both equitable and legal powers. See Judicature Act of 1873, § 24. 
74 FIFOOT, supra note 39 at 13 n.1. 
75 HEWARD, supra note 44 at 173. Other factors contributed to the success of the King’s Bench at 
attracting cases to the court. Mansfield was a very hard worker and, by all accounts, operated his court 
with a ruthless efficiency. See OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 5 (“H]e took particular care that this should not 
create delay or expense to the parties; and therefore he always dictated the case to the Court, and saw it 
signed by counsel, before another clause was called; and always made it a condition in the rule, “that it 
should be set down to be argued within the first four days of the term.”). 
76 According to Heward, the number of commercial cases (e.g., “goods sold and delivered”, 
“money”, “promissory notes”, “policy of assurance”, and “bills of exchange”) grew 105 percent, from 217 
during the period 1761-1765 to 444 during the period 1776-1780, where as the total number of other cases 
grew from 75 percent (134 to 235) over the same periods. See HEWARD, supra note 44, at 105-06. 
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and various monetary disputes saw similar increases, while common law standards, like 
trover and trespass increased at much lower rates.77 
Another measure of Mansfield’s success is his impact on legal thinkers and legal  
aggregators of the day. Blackstone, the greatest of these, wrote, just nine years after 
Mansfield became chief justice, that “the learning relating to . . . insurance[] hath of late 
years been greatly improved by a series of judicial decisions, which have now established 
the law.”78 Judge Buller, writing seven years after Mansfield stepped down, described 
the impact:  
 
Before [Mansfield] we find that in Courts of law all the evidence in mercantile 
cases was thrown together . . . and they produced no established principle. From 
that time we all know the great study has been to find some certain general 
principles...not only to rule the particular case then under consideration, but to 
serve as a guide for the future.79 
 
Writing with a bit more historical perspective, Oldham writes that Mansfield was 
one of the two “most important judicial figures in the law of bankruptcy”80, and the 
elucidator of the fundamental legal principles of insurance and negotiable instruments, 
where his chief contribution was “cogency”.81 Mansfield brought, “with considerable 
success”, merchant customs “harmoniously” into the common law.82 Mansfield 
accomplished the reform of commercial law—in fact, the capture of commercial 
regulation by law—in part through an alternation of legal discourse.83 Clarity, which 
commerce demanded as a precondition for using law courts, was achieved by changing 
opinion delivery practices in a way designed to unify the judicial voice.  
But the change from seriatim opinions to opinions of the court was short-lived. 
On the retirement of Mansfield, Lord Kenyon put an end to the practice, and the judges 
returned to the practice of seriatim opinions.84 This tradition preserved until very 
recently in all multimember English courts.85 
 
B. Early American Practices 
 
                                                
77 Trover, or an action for the taking of property, went from 32 to 44, trespass from 7 to 16. See id. 
78 See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *461. 
79 Lickbarrow v Mason, 2 TR 63, 74; 100 ER 35 (1787). 
80 OLDHAM, supra note 36 at 107. 
81 Id. at 124, 163.  
82 Id. at 365, 368. 
83 Id. at 365 (“[Mansfield] strove with considerable success to absorb the customs of merchants 
into the common law.”). 
84 Until recently they delivered their opinions seriatim, each Lord reading aloud his judgment and 
the reasons for it. The Lords no longer routinely deliver five separate opinions, although they do more 
frequently announce separate opinions than our Supreme Court. J. H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LEGAL HISTORY 204-11 (3d ed.) (1990). 
85 The Law Lords, who serve as the Supreme Court of Great Britain in some cases, routinely 
delivered opinions seriatim, with each of the five judges announcing an individual judgment with reasons. 
See LOUIS BLOM-COOPER & GAVIN DREWRY, FINAL APPEAL: A STUDY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN ITS JUDICIAL 
CAPACITY 81-82, 523 (1972). This practice recently waned. See also PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS 109-10 
(1982) (noting that the Lords no longer routinely deliver five separate opinions). 
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England’s long tradition of seriatim opinions crossed the Atlantic along with 
much of the common law during the formative stages of American judicial 
development.86 Early American jurists learned the law by studying the English common 
law, and therefore adopted many of its practices and institutions. In addition, many of 
the state courts were established before Mansfield’s discursive innovation, so in every 
state court and in the early years of the Supreme Court, American judges continued the 
practice of seriatim opinions.87 
But Mansfield’s change was evident to young American courts and judges, so in 
some cases it was emulated. In several states, the practice of Lord Mansfield was 
adopted as a way to increase the power of the courts vis-à-vis the other branches of 
government. Jurists in these states saw how Mansfield was able to increase the power of 
his court at the expense of other forms of power, and were eager to emulate this power 
grab. For example, in Virginia soon after the Revolution, Judge Edmund Pendleton 
became the chief judge of the court of appeals.88 Pendleton admired Mansfield and 
“considered him as the greatest luminary of law that any age had ever produced.”89 
Pendleton introduced Mansfield's practice of “making up opinions in secret & delivering 
them as the Oracles of the court.”90 
This practice was widely criticized by Thomas Jefferson and other Republicans. 
Due to this political pressure, upon the ascension of Judge Spencer Roane to Judge 
Pendleton’s seat on the bench some years later, the practice ceased and the tradition of 
seriatim opinions was quickly reinstated.91 Roane shared Jefferson’s view about the role 
of the judiciary, which is best expressed in a letter he sent to Roane after the decision in 
Marbury v. Madison: “The constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in 
the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist, and shape into any form they please.”92 
Politics was not yet completely comfortable with judges playing such a powerful role in 
policy. 
Thomas Jefferson’s role in returning to seriatim opinions in Virginia courts is not 
surprising since he was a vocal critic of courts and the threat to democracy an 
aggrandizement of judicial power posed.93 This battle against Judge Pendleton in 
                                                
86 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 112 (“To fill the gap [in American law at the beginning], English 
materials were used, English reports cited, English judges quoted as authority.”). 
87 See SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott D. Gerber ed., 1998); see 
also David P. Currie, Review of Seriatim: The Supreme Court Before John Marshall (Scott D. Gerber ed.) 
105 AM. HIST. REV. 1301, 1301 (2000) (noting that “the justices of the time deliver[ed] their opinions 
seriatim.”). 
88 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1460-63 (Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1984). 
89 Id.; Mansfield was a hero to many early colonial lawyers, so it is not surprising that his 
experiment with unanimous, anonymous opinions would be something they were willing to try. See 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 109 (“One of the cultural heroes of the American legal elite was England’s 
Lord Mansfield.”). 
90 Id. 
91 See Donald G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme Court Dissent, 3 WILLIAM & MARY QUART. 353, 
354 (1953) (“In Virginia, . . . Judge Pendleton, taking Mansfield as his model, had instituted the secret, 
unanimous opinion in the state bench; his successor, Judge Roane, had abolished the practice.”). 
92 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819), in THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904—5). 
93 See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG 
REPUBLIC (1971). 
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Virginia foreshadowed a battle with John Marshall over the same issue regarding the 
way the Supreme Court delivered opinions. In fact, this single issue would become one 
of the predominant political issues of the age, embroiling the nation’s legal system for a 
decade and threatening the political stability of the young nation.94 The winners of the 
battle—Marshall and the Federalists it turns out—would use their victory over the form 
of legal discourse to build much of what we recognize as the American legal system. The 
Supreme Court and its relation with the other branches of government as we know it 
today, looks like it does today because of Marshall’s ability to carry the day with respect 
to how legal opinions should be issued from the bench. 
Jefferson praised the seriatim system of announcing the law for four reasons: (1) 
it increased transparency and led to more accountability; (2) it showed that each judge 
had considered and understood the case; (3) it gave more or less weight to a precedent 
based on the vote of the judges; (4) and it allowed judges in the future to overrule bad 
law based on the reasoning of their predecessors.95 The overarching rationale for 
Jefferson’s preference was to limit what he viewed as the undemocratic power of courts. 
First, Jefferson argued for a return to seriatim opinions to increase the 
transparency of the decision making process in order to reign in the power of the 
judiciary. In Jefferson’s view, the practice of issuing an “opinion of the court” insulated 
any single justice from criticism. In this way, “judicia[l] perversions of the Constitution 
will forever be protected.”96 Opinions of the court were the shield that insulated the 
justices from obloquy and perhaps even impeachment. Jefferson described the practice 
of issuing opinions as an entire court without a public vote as a “most condemnable” 
practice in which the justices “cook[ed] up a decision in caucus and deliver[ed] it by one 
of their members as the opinion of the court, without the possibility of our knowing how 
many, who, and for what reasons each member concurred.”97 In Jefferson’s opinion it 
was not only the particular decisions that were to be condemned but also the process 
which “smother[ed] evidence” and allowed the justices to decide important questions 
without “justify[ing] the reasons which led to their opinion.”98 
 Second, Jefferson worried that judges were lazy, aloof, or otherwise absent from 
decision making on important legal questions. Jefferson reasoned that requiring a judge 
to write out his argument for each case would provide sufficient incentive for each judge 
to adequately consider the legal merits of the case. Jefferson wrote: 
 
Let [each judge] prove by his reasoning that he has read the 
papers, that he has considered the case, that in the 
application of the law to it, he uses his own judgment 
                                                
94 See generally JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, 
AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2003). Jefferson and Marshall battled repeatedly 
over the extent of judicial power in the early Republic. See, e.g., id. at 285 (noting that Jefferson criticized 
Marshall’s opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, writing to Judge Spencer Roane: “The great object of my fear is 
the federal judiciary. . . . Let the eye of vigilance never be closed.”).  
95 In this final capacity, dissenting opinions act as an “antiprecedent” that allows future judges to 
base their decision to overrule the previous opinion based on established legal reasoning. 
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Pleasants (December 1821), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 198-99 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1892-99).  
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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independently and unbiased by party views and personal 
favor or disfavor.99 
 
 Third, Jefferson wrote that multiple opinions not only “communicated [the law] 
by [the judges] several modes of reasoning, it showed whether the judges were 
unanimous or divided, and gave accordingly more or less weight to the judgment as a 
precedent.”100 All Jefferson really wanted was a vote. “Why should not every judge be 
asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay? . . . it would show 
whether the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly the weight of 
their authority.”101 
This practice of dissent by vote only was occasionally practiced in the early years 
of the Court102 and has been advocated by some modern commentators.103 To Jefferson, 
who was fearful of the aggrandizement of power in the judiciary,104 this would allow the 
legislature or other courts to respond appropriately to the decision—follow it, evade it, 
or bypass it with legislation or constitutional amendment—based on the “strength” of 
the opinion. Dissent, with or without opinion, would serve this function. 
 Finally, Jefferson acknowledged that temporal communication between current 
and future judges allowed for bad law to be overturned more easily.105 Jefferson knew of 
English cases in which laws were occasionally overruled based on “dissents” in previous 
seriatim opinions. Jefferson acknowledged this when he wrote that “[i]t sometimes 
happened too that when there were three opinions against one, the reasoning of the one 
was so much the most cogent as to become afterwards the law of the land.”106 This is the 
most powerful justification for dissent. In fact, Jefferson was foreshadowing to an extent 
the future of the Supreme Court and the power of dissenting opinions when he called for 
this sort of deliberation from judge to judge across time. To take just two of the many 
examples from Supreme Court history, dissents in cases such as Lochner v. New York107 
and Plessy v. Ferguson,108 were instrumental in changing the law many years in the 
future.109  
                                                
99 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (March 4, 1823), in 7 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 278-79 (Henry A. Washington, ed., 1853-54). 
100 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Oct. 27, 1822), in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1460-63 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1990). 
101 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (Jun. 6, 1823), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 99 at 293-98. 
102 For example, in Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. 370 (1813), Justice Johnson dissented from the 
opinion of the Court, but did not state his reasons. 
103 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 174 (1996). 
104 Thomas Jefferson strongly disagreed with Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of the 
judiciary as the “least dangerous branch.” See THE FEDERALIST 78, 392-399 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
105 Of course dissenting opinions can be used to overturn “good” law too. 
106 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice William Johnson (October 27, 1822) in THOMAS 
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 100 at 1460-63. 
107 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
108 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
109 The overruling of laissez-faire constitutionalism based on Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner 
was the first time in Supreme Court history that a fundamental jurisprudential doctrine was overruled on 
the basis of a prior dissenting opinion. Similarly, it was Justice Harlan’s lone dissent in Plessy that would 
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For these reasons perhaps, but more likely out of tradition, the Supreme Court, 
like most of the state courts, initially emulated the seriatim practice of their brethren on 
England’s highest courts. The fact that decisions of the Supreme Court were issued as a 
collection of separate opinions, with each justice issuing an opinion of the case with 
reasons for the decision, also limited the Court’s power. Just as in the King’s Bench 
before and after Mansfield, this style of opinion delivery created substantial uncertainty 
and instability in the law. 110  
Calder v. Bull, a classic case from the pre-Marshall Supreme Court, demonstrates 
this problem perfectly.111 Decided in 1798, the Court considered whether a statute 
passed by the Connecticut legislature overturning a state court probate decision violated 
the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution.112 At least four justices wrote 
opinions on the ex post facto issue, and the holding was therefore highly confused. The 
modern interpretation of the collection of seriatim opinions is that the constitutional 
clause applies only to retroactive punishment, but, according to David Currie, “the 
practice of seriatim opinions . . . . make[s] it difficult to say that this was the holding of 
the Court . . . .”113 Currie goes on to conclude that “Calder illustrates the uncertainty that 
can arise when each Justice writes separately . . .,”114 and that “[t]he practice of seriatim 
opinions . . . . weakened the force of the [Court’s] decisions . . ..”115 
The result of this practice was a weak and divided Court unable to assert any real 
authority.116 Although the Federalists, including the first chief justice, John Jay, wanted 
to assert the Court’s power to ensure the supremacy of federal law, Anti-Federalist 
antipathy toward the federal judiciary continued to dominate the political scene.117  
The weakness of the Court was demonstrated by the negative reception received 
by many of its early opinions. Characteristic of the hostility to the Court during this 
period was reaction of the Anti-Federalists to the Court’s opinion in Chisholm v 
Georgia.118 Chisholm held that a state was not immune to suit by a private citizen in 
                                                                                                                                                       
later provide much of the eloquent ammunition against “separate but equal” laws. With the words, “the 
Constitution is color blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,” Harlan set the stage 
for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954), and much of the civil rights movement. This is the 
power of dissent, for good or bad. 
110 As noted by Professor David Currie, seriatim opinions may be beneficial in that they may 
provide more information germane to predicting future outcomes. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 14, n.61 (1985) (“Yet 
seriatim opinions actually may give us a better basis for predicting later decisions.”).  
111 3 U.S. 386 (1798).  
112 Id. at 387 (interpreting article I, section 10). 
113 CURRIE, supra note 110 at 44. 
114 Id. at 45. 
115 Id. at 55. 
116 Furthermore, the circuit riding duties of the justices eroded the spirit and moral of the Court, 
contributing to its ineffectiveness. These duties were especially draining of the justices’ energy because of 
the difficulty of traveling during this era. When John Jay referred to a lack of “energy” on the Court, it was 
riding circuit that was the likely culprit. Thus Congress, state legislatures, and state courts were the 
dominant policy makers during this period. 
117 See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 93 at 12 (“Throughout George Washington’s first administration the 
federal judiciary tried to avoid becoming engaged in political controversies or becoming entangled in 
questions outside its immediate jurisdiction.”). 
118 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
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federal court.119 Legislators in Georgia responded to this decision by introducing a 
constitutional amendment to restrict the power of federal courts to hear suits against 
states brought by citizens of other states. This amendment quickly passed the 
ratification requirements of Article V and became the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution.120 With this severe blow to the institutional power of the Court, Chief 
Justice Jay abandoned his leadership of the Court in order to become governor of New 
York.121 When asked by President John Adams to resume his duties in 1800, Jay refused 
on the grounds that the Court lacked any prestige or authority and would be unable to 
earn the “public confidence and respect.”122 
Following Jay’s departure and the brief leadership of John Rutledge,123 Oliver 
Ellsworth was appointed as chief justice. Ellsworth was an advocate of a stronger central 
government. In order to increase federal power, Chief Justice Ellsworth attempted to 
initiate a policy of handing down opinions per curiam—anonymous and unanimous 
opinions that would emulate Mansfield’s opinion of the court. Ellsworth believed that by 
issuing decisions that would speak for the Court as a whole without dissent, the power of 
the Court, and thereby the power of the national government, would be increased. This 
reform was unsuccessful in part because of the lack of political will on the part of those 
opposed to seriatim opinions, in part because Ellsworth’s tenure as chief justice was 
brief due to illness, and undoubtedly for other reasons as well.124 The seed, however, 
that would allow the growth of national power was sowed. 
When Ellsworth left office, however, the future of the Court was not clear. This 
was in part because the Supreme Court’s very existence was questioned at the Founding. 
Although eventually established as a tri-equal branch of government, the creation of a 
national court was contested at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The delegates 
realized the need for a stronger national government than existed under the Articles of 
Confederation but many representatives considered the existing state courts as 
sufficient for interpreting national laws and thought the federal judiciary to be the 
biggest potential “source of tyranny”.125 
                                                
119 Id. 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens 
of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”). This was one of only two constitutional 
amendments that was adopted explicitly to repudiate a Supreme Court decision—the other being the 16th 
Amendment (federal income tax) which was in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which declared the federal income tax of 1894 unconstitutional.  
121 Similarly, Robert H. Harrison refused an appointment to the Court in 1789 to become 
chancellor of Maryland. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 133.  
122 RICHARD MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION, AND THE COURT (1967). Jay “left the bench perfectly 
convinced that under a system so defective it would not obtain the energy, weight, and dignity which are 
essential to its affording due support to the national government, nor acquire the public confidence and 
respect which, as a court of laws resort of the justice of the nation, it should possess.” 4 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 285 (1893). 
123 John Rutledge was appointed by President Washington in 1795. Rutledge participated in two 
cases as chief justice before his nomination was defeated in the Senate in December of 1795. 
124 See WILLIAM G. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905). 
125 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 186 (1997) (describing the position of the Anti-Federalists as articulated by “Brutus”, a New 
York writer responding to the Federalist Papers). 
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In the end, Federalists, who envisioned a national judiciary to settle interstate 
disputes, were victorious.126 The Supreme Court was their reward. By modern standards 
this was a substantial expression of national power, but for the first decade of its 
existence it remained untapped as the Supreme Court was neglected and ignored by 
lawyers, politicians, and the public. The Court was not provided with a chambers and 
the job of chief justice was refused by several prominent statesmen. According to the 
first chief justice, John Jay, in its first ten years the Court “lacked energy, weight, and 
dignity.”127 Everything changed with appointment of John Marshall as chief justice in 
1801.  
 
C. The Era of Unanimity 
 
In 1800, the year of Ellsworth’s retirement from the Court, the Federalists, who 
had dominated politics since 1789, were on the way out. The Federalists were advocates 
of a strong central government, were skeptical of state powers, and distrusted direct 
democracy. By contrast Jefferson’s Republicans emphasized the decentralized authority 
of the states and the people. With the defeat of Federalist John Adams by Jefferson in 
the election of 1800, the power of the central government seemed to be on the wane. 
The outgoing Federalists, however, were not content to entrust the Constitution to 
Jefferson’s Republicans. 
Realizing that they were about to lose control of the only two branches of 
government with any power, the Federalists looked to secure control of the third branch 
as a possible bulwark of national power. The branch that they seized, however, needed 
serious reform in order to be strong enough to counteract, or at least curtail, the power 
of the new president and the Republican-controlled Congress. During its first 16 terms, 
it heard only about 60 cases, only about 10 were of any significance, and when the 
government moved to Washington in 1800, the Court had “no library, no office space, 
no clerks or secretaries,” and heard cases on the first floor of the Capitol, “adjacent to 
the main staircase”.128 For these reasons and because the power of the Court to interpret 
the Constitution was not clear at this time, Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary 
as “beyond comparison the weakest of the three branches.”129  
 
1. The Marshall Court 
 
The Federalist reform came in two forms: the outgoing Federalist Congress 
passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, and lame duck President Adams appointed John 
Marshall as chief justice. Each of these acts was intended not merely to secure Federalist 
control of the Court, but to increase the power of the Court at the expense of the 
legislative and executive branches. 
                                                
126 See id. 
127 MORRIS, supra note 122 at 81. See also, Robert P. Frankel, Jr., Judicial Beginnings: The 
Supreme Court in the 1790s, 4 HISTORY COMPASS 1102, 1104 (2006).  
128 JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 285 (1996). 
129 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
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The Judiciary Act doubled the number of circuit courts (from three to six) and 
created 16 new judgeships to fill them.130 This was intended to do two things to increase 
Federalist control over the judiciary. First, it gave outgoing President Adams a chance to 
populate the federal courts with Federalists. Second, it eliminated the circuit-riding 
duties of Supreme Court justices, who previously sat on both the Supreme Court and on 
the three existing circuit courts. This freed up Supreme Court judges from having to 
hear cases outside of the Capital, and was designed to increase the Court’s prestige and 
to increase the desirability of being a Supreme Court justice. 
Riding circuit was a major impediment to an energetic and collegial Court. The 
idea was that, relieved of their duties to travel and sit on other courts, the justices could 
live together in Washington, enabling them to develop strong relationships and to work 
united on important issues, giving the Court the “energy” that Jay claimed it lacked. 
This reform was not effective, however, as the Republican-controlled Congress repealed 
the Act in 1802, and Supreme Court justices continued to ride circuit until 1869. 
The Federalist plan to control the judiciary therefore had to rely entirely on the 
appointment of John Marshall to be chief justice of the United States. This was not lost 
on Marshall. The day Federalist enemy President Jefferson was inaugurated, he wrote to 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: “Of the importance of the judiciary at all times, but more 
especially the present I am fully impressed. I shall endeavor in the new office to which I 
am called not to disappoint my friends.”131 
Marshall was an “ardent nationalist,” who considered himself an American before 
a Virginian. He wrote that “I was confirmed in the habit of considering America as my 
country and Congress as my government,. . . . I had imbibed these sentiments so 
thoroughly that they constituted a part of my being.”132 Despite these firm beliefs in the 
national government, Marshall was a reluctant political actor. Marshall entered politics 
following Shays’s Rebellion of 1786 only because he felt that the nation was in danger of 
collapse.133 Like the apparent danger posed by Daniel Shays, Marshall viewed 
Republican control of the government as dangerous to his conception of the nation. The 
“gloomy views”134 of Federalists upon Jefferson’s ascendancy were captured by John 
Marshall in a letter he wrote to a Congressman from Massachusetts at the time: “I feel 
that real Americanism is on the ebb.”135 Marshall carried his national spirit to the Court. 
Unlike the failed attempt with the Judiciary Act, this tactic of the Federalists 
proved to be a tremendous success. Marshall found a ready historical example of how 
courts could increase their power in the experience of Lord Mansfield, who was a 
“cultural hero of the American legal elite” at that time, and whose reform in the early 
                                                
130 The Sixth Circuit only got one additional judge. The Act also created 10 new district courts, 
overseen by existing district court judges, who were federalists. These were the famous “midnight judges”. 
See David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1719-
21 (2007) (describing the Judiciary Act of 1801 as the “Midnight Judges Act”). 
131 Letter from John Marshall to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Mar. 4, 1801), in 6 THE PAPERS OF 
JOHN MARSHALL 89 (1990). 
132 JOHN MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 9-10 (John Stokes Adams, ed., 1937). 
133 SMITH, supra note 128 at 5. 
134 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE JR., THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 15 (1919) (“Of all the leading Federalists, 
John Marshall was the only one who refused to ‘bawl,’ at least in the public ear; and yet, as we have seen 
and shall again find, he entertained the gloomy views of his political associates.”). 
135 Letter from John Marshall to Harrison Gray Otis (Aug. 5, 1800), in 4 MARSHALL PAPERS, at 
204-05. 
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1760s was recent history for the Founders.136 Marshall increased the power of the Court 
vis-à-vis the other branches of government by dramatically altering the way in which the 
Court decided and announced its opinions, just as Mansfield did and for the same 
reasons. 
In an expression of raw political power, Marshall abandoned the tradition of 
seriatim opinions and established an “Opinion of the Court” that would speak for all 
justices through a single voice.137 This change was viewed as an “act[] of audacity” and 
“assumption[] of power”.138 Marshall used his leadership skills, the power of persuasion, 
and other tactics lost to history to convince the other five members of the Court that 
they should abandon the Court’s accepted practice of issuing seriatim opinions. Cases 
were now decided by private conference in which the justices achieved a compromise 
position. An opinion, commanding an unknown vote, was drafted by an anonymous 
justice and then issued under the name of “John Marshall” who signed for the Court: 
“For the first time the Chief Justice disregarded the custom of delivery of opinions by 
the Justices seriatim, and, instead, calmly assumed the function of announcing, himself, 
the views of that tribunal.”139 Marshall’s great discursive revolution, which would cause 
fundamental shifts in the power of American government, began boldly with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Talbot v. Seeman.140 
Although the question presented in Talbot was on its face a simple admiralty 
issue regarding payments owed in cases of salvage, the context of the case required the 
Court to take sides in a political debate about a raging “quasi-war” with France. The ship 
involved in the case was the “Amelia”, which was owned by Seeman, a resident of a 
neutral city-state in the war between England and France. The ship, an armed merchant 
ship carrying some English goods, was captured by the French and then recaptured by 
Talbot, the captain of the American frigate “Constitution”.141 Talbot sued seeking salvage 
rights—half of the value of the cargo—while Seeman argued that the ship was neutral 
and in no danger of being condemned by the French, thus there was no service rendered 
and therefore no salvage rights owed. 
The controversy required the Court to not only decide the narrow question about 
whether the risk of condemnation was sufficient to justify payment to Talbot, but also to 
interpret conflicting congressional and presidential actions regarding America’s role in 
the quasi-war with France. In short, the Court was being asked to make a highly political 
statement in the guise of a salvage case. 
The decision required the Court to decide two questions: (1) was the seizure by 
Talbot legal, and (2) did Talbot provide a valuable service to Seeman. Federalists, who 
were proponents of the war with France, argued strongly for Talbot; Republicans, who 
wanted to avoid foreign entanglements and defended neutral shipping, argued strongly 
                                                
136 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 109. 
137 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 40 (2001) (“Marshall, in what one of his 
biographers calls ‘an act of audacity,’ changed this tradition in the Supreme Court of the United States so 
that an opinion for the Court was delivered by only one of the justices.”). 
138 BEVERIDGE, supra note 134 at 16. 
139 Id. 
140 5 U.S. 1 (1801). 
141 This is the famous “Old Ironsides”. See http://www.ussconstitution.navy.mil/.  
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for Seeman.142 The Court answered both questions in the affirmative, but did so in a 
manner designed to please or placate everyone, thereby allowing the Court to 
dramatically increase its power. Marshall convinced the other justices that 
 
[i]f a complex, politically charged case like Talbot could be resolved with a single 
opinion, not only would the holding enjoy greater legitimacy, but the identity of 
the Supreme Court as [the] nation’s highest tribunal would become manifest and 
its prestige would be enhanced enormously.143 
 
The decision the Court reached shows not only the compromise that the Court 
needed to reach to speak with one voice but also the need to prevent a political backlash 
against the Court’s new power play. The Court held for Talbot (a victory for the 
Federalists who Marshall swore to serve), but it reduced Talbot’s salvage claim to one-
sixth of the ship’s value (down from the traditional half) and then allowed Seeman to 
deduct his costs from this amount (a rarity), making the damages nominal (a victory for 
the Republicans). Marshall created the power of the Court to decide whether 
congressional statutes authorized seizure of vessels of foreign powers and what role the 
executive had in foreign policy,144 while insulating the decision (and thus the new power) 
from critics. Accepting the decision, which Jefferson and the Republicans did 
reluctantly, opened the door for the Court to assert, just two years later, the power of 
judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. 
Thus was born the “Opinion of the Court,” which, in a revised form, survives to 
this day. The Court now had weight and dignity as well as energy, and it was not subject 
to political sniping. John Jay’s challenge was met, and the Court was then able to assert 
itself as a tri-equal branch of government.145 This innovation – a paradigmatic shift in 
legal discourse – initiated a new era of Supreme Court power. The result was a focusing 
of the power of the national judiciary, and consequently, the shift in the locus of power 
from the nonlegal to the legal, and from the states to the federal government. This 
evolution in the function of law was enabled through a change in the form in which law 
is established and delivered. In 1801, the form of legal discourse transmogrified to adapt  
to Law’s new role in the emerging modern world. 
 
*  *  * 
 
                                                
142 To add to the mystique of the case, on appeal from a district court ruling for Talbot, Federalist 
Alexander Hamilton represented Talbot, while Republican, and Hamilton’s archenemy and eventual 
murderer, Aaron Burr represented Seeman. 
143 SMITH, supra note 128 at 293. 
144 In an oft quoted passage, the Court wrote: “The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution 
of the United States, vested in Congress, the Acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in 
this enquiry.” See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. at 28.  
145 See William J. Brennan Jr., In Defense of Dissents, supra note 9 at 427 (“This change in 
custom at the time consolidated the authority of the Court and aided in the general recognition of the 
Third Branch as co-equal partner with the other branches. Not surprisingly, not everyone was pleased 
with the new practice.”). 
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During the first ten years as chief justice, Marshall “wrote” 90 percent of the 
opinions for the Court.146 The only opinions that were not issued under his name during 
this period were in cases where Marshall tried the case below while riding circuit,147 
where he had a personal interest in the case,148 or when he rarely dissented from his 
fellow justices.149 Marshall did himself dissent occasionally, but he generally led by 
example and acquiesced to the compromise position. This is demonstrated by 
comparing Marshall’s dissenting proclivity with his successors. As shown on Table A, in 
the entire history of the Court, Marshall is the chief justice least likely to dissent.  
 
TABLE A: Dissenting Behavior of Chief Justices 
Chief Justice 
Dates of 
Service Number of Cases 
Number of 
Chief Justice 
Dissenting 
Opinions 
Dissent 
Proportion 
(percent) 
Marshall 1801-1835 1187 3 0 
Taney 1836-1863 1708 38 2  
Chase 1864-1873 1109 33 3  
Waite 1874-1887 2642 45 2  
Fuller 1888-1909 4866 113 2  
White 1910-1920 2541 39 2  
Taft 1921-1929 1708 16 1  
Hughes 1930-1940 2050 46 2  
Stone 1941-1945 704 95 13  
Vinson 1946-1952 723 90 12  
Warren 1953-1968 1772 215 12  
Burger 1969-1985 2755 184 7  
Rehnquist 1986-2005 2131 182 9  
Roberts 2005-present 104 3 3  
     
Source: Westlaw SCT database    
 
Marshall’s plan was a dramatic success. From 1801 to 1835 there were very few 
dissenting opinions from the hundreds of opinions of the Court (Figure 1) and the Court 
decided such fundamental legal issues as the supremacy of federal law, judicial review,150 
the implied powers of the national government,151 the Court’s power over state court 
                                                
146 Opinions were issued under Marshall’s name in all cases in 1801, 1805, and 1806; in 91 percent 
of cases in 1803; 89 percent in 1804; 90 percent in 1807, 83 percent in 1808; 88 percent in 1809; 73 
percent in 1810; and 58 percent in 1812. Over the next 23 years, Marshall accounted for only about 40 
percent of opinions. This remains, however, about four times as many opinions as are written by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist. 
147 See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). 
148 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
149 See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64 (1827). 
150 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
151 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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decisions implicating federal questions,152 and federal power over interstate commerce153 
without much dispute, open challenge, or probability of reversal. 
Figure 1:  Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Court 
During the Marshall Court (1801-1835)
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In fact, it was not until 1804 when President Jefferson appointed Justice William 
Johnson, who would be known as the “First Dissenter”, that the first dissenting opinion 
was recorded.154 Jefferson recognized this change in discourse as a blatant attempt to 
counteract the results of the congressional and presidential elections, and to increase 
the power of the judiciary. “The Federalists,” he wrote “retreated into the Judiciary as a 
stronghold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to dislodge them.”155 In order to 
counter the lack of political accountability in the Court, Jefferson urged Republican-
appointed judges to revert to the practice of seriatim opinions.156 Most famously, a 
series of letters between Jefferson and Johnson in 1822 in which the former urged the 
latter to dissent in nearly every case. This urging was somewhat successful at breaking 
Marshall’s grip on the Court. As shown on Figure 1, the number of dissenting opinions 
increased in the later years of the Marshall Court as Jefferson appointees began to 
disrupt the practice of unanimity. After ten years of near unanimity, the next 25 years 
saw an increased number of dissenting opinions. 
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of dissents, the result was still only 
one dissent in about every twenty-five cases decided during the Marshall Court, the 
                                                
152 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (Marshall recused himself because he was 
personally involved in this case; Joseph Story wrote the opinion); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton 264 
(1821). 
153 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
154 See Herbert v. Wren, 11 U.S. 370 (1813). Johnson’s first dissent was tentative: the report states 
that he dissented but “did not state his reasons”. Id. at 382.  
155 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY v 1, 193 (1926). 
156 For example, many of Jefferson’s letters cited above were correspondence between Jefferson 
and Justice Johnson in which Jefferson extolled the virtues of traditional seriatim opinions.  
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lowest percentage in the history of the Court.157 The dissenting opinions of the Marshall 
Court are listed in the Appendix. Notably, of the 52 dissenting opinions issued during 
the Marshall Court, Jefferson appointees William Johnson and Brockholst Livingston 
authored almost 60 percent.158 Although law at the time of the Marshall Court was 
considered less political than it is today, even at this early time, dissent was often an 
overtly political act. Still, Johnson—on a political mission of sorts—sided with Marshall 
far more often than not, signing the Opinion of the Court about 96 percent of the 
time.159 According to legal historian Lawrence Friedman, Johnson was under Marshall’s 
“spell.”160  
Although Marshall did effectively control the discourse of the Court, he did not 
dominate the “thinking” of the Court.161 Instead, Marshall effectively led the Court. 
Marshall established and maintained an atmosphere during conferences that was 
conducive to compromise. After the decision was made, Marshall managed the public 
and political perception of the Court through the issuance of unanimous and 
anonymous opinions. Without disagreements, the opinions carried greater authority, 
and individual justices were shielded from outrage or impeachment charges.162  
This “authority” was simply assumed by Marshall, and it has remained virtually 
unquestioned for over 200 years. Many powerful individuals have tried to usurp it – 
President Jefferson tried to impeach Justice Chase; President Jackson refused to 
enforce decisions he disagreed with; President Lincoln famously refused to enforce a 
writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney; several presidents either increased 
                                                
157 See Figure 3. 
158 Johnson and Livingston (Jefferson appointees) authored 20 and 9 respectively; Thompson 
(Monroe appointee) authored 6; Baldwin and McLean (Jackson appointees) authored 6 and 2 
respectively; Story and Duvall (Madison appointees) authored 4 and 1; Chase (Washington appointee) 
authored 3; Marshall and Washington (Adams appointees) authored 3 and 1. 
159 Johnson heard approximately 977 cases during his time on the Court (1805-1833); he 
dissented or wrote seriatim 39 times (or in 4% of cases). See David G. Morgan, The Origin of Supreme 
Court Dissent, 10 WILLIAM & MARY QUARTERLY 353, 377 (1953). 
160 FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 128. 
161 HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835 51 (1997) (noting 
that there is “undeniable evidence that Chief Justice Marshall did not dominate his colleagues; the 
domination theory has been so thoroughly refuted that Professor David Currie referred to it as the story of 
‘John Marshall and the six dwarfs.’”). 
162 Although the call to impeach a Supreme Court justice for a particular decision seems 
outrageous today, during this era, such charges were frequently threatened and occasionally levied against 
judges. For example, in 1805 Associate Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the House and tried in 
the Senate. The ground for the impeachment was Chase’s handling of several criminal trials in which he 
tried to implement the Adams Administration’s attempts to silence political foes. However, the charges 
against Chase were shown to be politically motivated and he was acquitted in the Senate. Judge Charles 
Pickering was not so lucky. A Federalist judge who “had committed no ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’” 
but was “a drunk, seriously deranged,” and overtly political in his handling of cases was impeached and 
convicted in 1804. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 129-130. This impeachment, like that of Alexander 
Addison, a Federalist judge from Pennsylvania who “harangued grand juries on political subjects” and was 
impeached and removed from office in 1803, was Jefferson’s attempt to create a “bogeyman” to threaten 
judges into good behavior. Id. at 129. Historians believe that it was largely effective, much like Roosevelt’s 
“court packing plan” 150 years later. Id. at 129, 132 (“The failure of [the Chase] impeachment was not a 
clear-cut victory for either side. . . . The judges won independence, but at a price. Their openly political 
role was reduced.”). 
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or proposed enlarging the Court to alter its power;163 and numerous representatives and 
senators have proposed curtailing Supreme Court power through legislation164 – but 
none have succeeded in undoing the institutional authority created in large part by 
Marshall’s discursive change. 
Marshall was able to achieve the power of unanimity and effectuate a 
fundamental change in legal discourse based, at least in part, on his own personal 
leadership skills. Marshall was revered for his ability to lead and to relate to others. 
Biographers describe him as able to “inspire confidence and trust” and “able to elicit a 
warm and supportive response from others.”165 In a famous quote, fellow justice Joseph 
Story responded to questions about Marshall’s motives on the Court: “I love his laugh—
it is too hearty for an intriguer.”166 Whether Marshall had a strategy or whether he was 
an “intriguer,” is a question without an easy answer. Jefferson famously accused 
                                                
163 The number of Supreme Court justices was originally set at six. See Judiciary Act of 1789 
[insert proper cite]. Changes in the number of justices have been made or proposed many times for 
political reasons. For example, when Jefferson was elected in 1800, the outgoing Federalist Congress 
reduced the number of justices to five, but this was increased to six and then seven by Republicans in 
Congress to give Jefferson two appointments. See [insert cite]. Andrew Jackson got two appointments 
when the Court grew to nine in 1837. See [insert cite]. Anti-slavery forces increased the Court to ten, but 
then after the Civil War, the Republicans reduced the number to seven to ensure Democrat Andrew 
Johnson would not get any appointments. See [insert cite]. When a Republican, U.S. Grant, was elected in 
1868, the Republicans gave him two new justices to appoint, expanding the Court back to nine. See [insert 
cite]. His nominees quickly made an impact, voting to reverse the Court’s recently created precedent in 
the Legal Tender cases. See [insert cite]. More recently, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan 
did not succeed in increasing the number of justices, but it did cause enough justices to reverse opposition 
to the New Deal to achieve the results intended. See [insert cite]. 
 164 For example, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was concerned that the Supreme Court 
would hold Congress’ reconstruction laws unconstitutional, so he introduced a bill in 1869 that would 
dramatically curtail the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction: “The judicial power extends only to cases between 
party and party . . . and does not include the President or Congress, or any of their acts . . . and all such 
acts are valid and conclusive on the matters to which they apply; . . . and no allegation  
or pretence of the invalidity thereof shall be excuse or defense for any neglect, refusal, or failure to 
perform any duty in regard to them." See Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at 2895 
(1869). Senator Lyman Trumbell of Illinois proposed a similar, albeit more narrow, limitation on the 
Court in 1868 and 1869, arguing that the reconstruction acts were “political in character” and the Court 
had no jurisdiction to pass upon them. See 40th Congress, 2nd Session, at 1204, 1428, 1621 (1868); see 
also 41st Congress, 2nd Session, at 3, 27, 45, 96, 152, 167 (1869). Senator Richard M. Johnson of 
Kentucky proposed giving the Senate appellate jurisdiction in cases in which the government was a party, 
allowing the Senate to effectively overrule Supreme Court opinions. See Annals of Congress, 17th 
Congress, 1st Session, Dec. 12, 1821, Jan. 14 and 15, 1822. In response to the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
much progressive legislation in the pre-New Deal period, Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Sr. of Wisconsin 
proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow two thirds of the Senate to overrule any decision 
of the Court. See Congressional Record, 67th Con2nd at 9073, Reprint of LaFollette's speech before the 
American Federation of Labor. 
165 JOHNSON, supra note 161 at 21. 
166 SMITH, supra note 128 at 291. 
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Marshall of deliberately manipulating the Constitution to achieve his own ends,167 and 
some modern observes agree, viewing his early opinions as highly political.168 
Marshall had nationalist tendencies, but so did his predecessor Chief Justice 
Ellsworth and many of his successors. But only Marshall was able to implement these 
tendencies in practice. What made Marshall different was his ability to assert the type of 
personal leadership necessary to achieve the goal of strong national power. But there 
were many “conditions of possibility” that enabled this change. Marshall and his fellow 
justices were able to achieve considerable unanimity because of their similar socio-
economic backgrounds. Justices were drawn entirely from the cadre of practicing 
lawyers or the government elite. All of the justices were propertied gentlemen and each 
had a strong sense of nationalism, a concern for private property rights, and accepted 
traditional principles of the legal profession of the era.169 In addition, for the first several 
decades of Court history, the justices all lived at a boardinghouse in Washington. This 
living arrangement added to the collegial environment of the Court and helped foster 
similar views among justices. Whatever the exact mix of reasons, Marshall was able to 
increase the power of the Court through a change in the discourse of the Court. 
 
2. The continuing tradition 
 
Unlike the experience with the “opinion of the court” in England, in this country 
the unanimity consensus continued to a great extent even after Marshall left the Court 
in 1835. Although the number of separate opinions increased slightly after Marshall 
resigned from the Court, Marshall’s practice of unanimity dominated the Supreme Court 
for over 100 years (Figure 2). 
  
                                                
167 “In Marshall’s hands the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text to be explained by his 
sophistry into any meaning which may subserve his personal malice.” Letter from Jefferson to Madison 
(May 25, 1810) in THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND 
JAMES MADISON 64 (M. Smith, ed. 1995). 
168 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443 (1989); John V. Orth, Book Review: John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 49 
S.C. L. REV. 633, 636 (1998) (“Marshall did seem to have a strategic vision of forcing . . . the national 
government to govern the nation.”). 
169 JOHNSON, supra note 161 at 96-97. 
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The unanimity discourse of Marshall changed over time. By 1814, Marshall did 
not sign the vast majority of opinions, but instead authored only about 50 percent. This 
was still a significant amount (especially compared to the approximately 15 percent of 
opinions authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist during his tenure), but it represented a 
changing of the guard. Furthermore, Jefferson appointees hostile to Marshall were 
beginning to assert their power on the Court, and other factors led to a decline in the 
collegiality of the Court. For example, by 1827, under pressure from Republicans and 
because newly appointed justices established residences in Washington, the 
“boardinghouse Court” was abolished. This would seriously undermine attempts to hold 
the Court together in unanimous blocks.170 In addition, many new justices who did not 
live in the boardinghouse renounced the brotherhood spirit that prevailed in the early 
Marshall Court.171 Evidence of the factions developing in the Court at this time is the fact 
that the percent of cases with a dissenting opinion increased from four percent under 
Marshall to nearly ten percent under his immediate successors.  
Despite these changes, the period from the end of Marshall’s term in 1835 to the 
beginning of John Harlan Stone’s term in 1941 saw little change in the discourse of 
Supreme Court opinions.172 Table B shows the frequency of dissenting opinions during 
each chief justiceship.  
 
TABLE B: Dissenting Proclivity  
Chief Justice Dates of Service Percent of Opinions with a Dissent 
                                                
170 Id. at 110-11. 
171 Id. 
172 “Yet, neither [Justice] Johnson nor any alter Justices could or would undo Marshall’s work. 
Doctrine changed; personalities and blocs clashed on the Supreme Court; power contended with power; 
but these struggles all took place within the fortress that Marshall had built.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 
134. 
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Marshall 1801-1835 4 
Taney 1836-1863 9 
Chase 1864-1873 9 
Waite 1874-1887 6 
Fuller 1888-1909 7 
White 1910-1920 5 
Taft 1921-1929 7 
Hughes 1930-1940 9 
Stone 1941-1945 27 
Vinson 1946-1952 48 
Warren 1953-1968 50 
Burger 1969-1985 59 
Rehnquist 1986-2005 56 
Roberts 2005-Present 47 
 
As shown on this table, the rate remained relatively constant at less than ten 
percent. Two primary factors seem to explain this result. First, the traits and leadership 
of the chief justices who succeeded Marshall; and, second, the legal atmosphere of the 
period and the type of cases heard by the Court.  
As for leadership, each chief justice from Marshall to Stone came from similar 
backgrounds,173 had remarkable leadership skills, and was committed to unanimity 
above all else. Melville Fuller (1888-1910) was described as an “excellent social 
leader….blessed with conciliatory and diplomatic traits.”174 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes characterized him as the greatest chief justice because of his ability to conduct 
the business of the Court without much dissent.175 Likewise, Chief Justice Edward White 
(1910-1920), was a former senate majority leader blessed with a “genial temperament 
and adroit logrolling skills that permitted him to mend fences and reinforce consensus 
norms in Court.”176 Following White was the legendary consensus builder, William 
Howard Taft (1921-1929). Taft “hated dissenting opinions, wrote very few himself, and 
made every effort to dissuade others from writing them.”177 Taft wrote that “I don’t 
approve of dissents generally, for I think in many cases where I differ from the majority, 
it is more important to stand by the Court and give its judgment weight than merely to 
record my individual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have it 
settled either way.”178 Taft imparted this tendency to his successor Charles Evans 
Hughes (1930-1940). Hughes discouraged dissent in order (to) shield internal divisions 
from public view.179 In a personal letter to another justice, Hughes explained why he 
                                                
173 Marshall, like his successors, was first and foremost a lawyer. He spent a career representing 
business interests in Virginia, and, like most of his contemporaries of the bench and bar, was a significant 
property owner. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 74 
(1996). 
174 SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 178 (1982). 
175 Id. at 178-79. 
176 James Watts, Edward Douglas White, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 1789-1969 (Leon Friedman and Fred Israel, eds., 1969). 
177 EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 180 (1976). 
178 WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 61 (1964). 
179 HENRY ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 230 (1986). 
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would join the majority opinion despite his strong reservations about the outcome: “I 
choke a little at swallowing your analysis, still I do not think it would serve any useful 
purpose to expose my views.”180 
In terms of case characteristics, many of the cases heard by the Court during this 
period were rather straightforward common law or admiralty cases and were therefore 
less contentious politically than modern cases.181 Talbot was the rare admiralty case, in 
that it involved questions of war and peace, as well as the power of the other two 
branches. Most Supreme Court cases were not like Talbot. These decisions were able to 
garner greater consensus in part because the common law provided numerous 
precedents. It was not until after the Erie decision in 1938 when federal common law 
was abandoned that the Supreme Court would routinely handle difficult, and politically 
sensitive, constitutional issues.182 In fact, federal courts did not have general federal 
question jurisdiction to hear matters arising under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States until 1875. This change from a common law court of last resort to a 
constitutional court caused a dramatic increase in the percentage of cases with a 
dissenting opinion. Consider that for its first 150 years, the Court did not decide a single 
case involving civil liberties, as we understand them today. The first cases to uphold civil 
liberties were the tripartite of test-oath cases (Ex parte Milligan, Ex parte Garland, and 
Ex parte Cummings) decided in 1866. There would be more contentious cases during 
the next few decades, including the upholding of “separate but equal laws” in Plessy v. 
Ferguson in 1896, but the Court’s cases were largely not politically contentious in the 
modern sense until the New Deal. 
 
D. The Rise of Dissent 
 
 The long-standing practice of virtual unanimity was abandoned as abruptly as it 
was begun. With the ascendancy of John Harlan Stone to chief justice in 1941, the Court 
began a trend writing separate opinions in most cases (Figure 2). Several possibilities 
may explain the rise, but one stands out in historical perspective. 
 For one, Stone tolerated and even encouraged dissent out of personal preference 
and practice. Stone was the first academic appointed to hold the position of chief justice, 
and this background made him more likely to want to encourage open debate. This 
academic pedigree and his personality, which favored debate and confrontation, 
manifest themselves in his frequent dissents during his time as an associate justice. This 
                                                
180 Id. at 224. 
181 Of the nearly 400 cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1801 and 1833, less than 50 (or 
about 12 percent) were “constitutional” cases according to Professor David Currie. See CURRIE, supra note 
110 at 65-193 (collecting and treating these cases; number counted by author). The most common cases 
during this time were traditional common law cases: property (17 percent), admiralty/prize cases in which 
the Court was an instance court (15 percent), procedure (15 percent), family law (10 percent), and 
contracts (9 percent). Chief Justice Rehnquist also describes 19th Century Supreme Court jurisprudence as 
largely run-of-the-mill by today’s standards, noting that the Court spent considerable time during the 
1860’s and 1870’s on railroad bond cases. See REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 90-1. 
182 Erie Railroad Co v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Prior to 1938, many constitutional 
questions of great import were decided, but the Supreme Court docket consisted mainly of routine 
common law and admiralty cases. Some of the more famous dissents of the early period arose in the tough 
constitutional questions. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. 393 
(1857), and Plessy v. Ferguson 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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proclivity to dissent continued when Stone was appointed chief justice—Stone was much 
more likely to dissent himself compared to his predecessors and remains the chief 
justice most likely to dissent (Table A). Just as chief justices from Marshall to Taft 
encouraged unanimity by their own practice of acquiescing in opinions with which they 
did not fully agree, so did Chief Justice Stone and his successors lead by example by 
issuing a substantial number of dissenting opinions themselves. This leadership may be 
a partial explanation for the dramatic increase in dissenting opinions during this time.  
It is Stone’s leadership that scholars argue caused the end of the consensus 
norm.183 For example, in the most prominent study of dissent in the political science 
literature, several possible explanations for the change in Supreme Court discourse were 
considered, but the authors concluded that, like the case of John Marshall and the rise 
of the unanimity norm, it was the leadership of Chief Justice Stone that was responsible 
for the change.184 
Other possible explanations examined by the authors were the change in docket 
from mandatory to discretionary review, the shift in the type of cases argued before the 
Court, internal politics of the Court, and large-scale changes in Court personnel at the 
time. Let us look at some of the theories considered and rejected: 
First, the authors examined the role of the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the move to 
a discretionary docket. Although it is possible that the new jurisdiction of discretion 
could create more dissent because only difficult and contentious cases would be granted 
certiorari, the authors conclude that this change was not responsible for the increase in 
dissents based on the fact that the rise in dissents is not seen until 1942, many years 
after passage of the Act.185 The time gap may be sufficient evidence that the direct or 
only cause of the change was not the Judiciary Act. It does not, however, eliminate the 
change in jurisdiction as a “condition of possibility” that contributed to the change in 
discourse.  
Another explanation considered and rejected by the authors was the increase in 
the Supreme Court caseload in the past 100 years. The authors reject this explanation 
out of hand because of a difference in timing. Although they argue that a dramatic 
increase in cases results in less time to build consensus and construct compromises, 
they conclude that the timing is again all wrong—the growth in the caseload they 
observed was not dramatic until 1960’s, 20 years after the rise of dissent. The authors’ 
data confuses the rise in federal cases, which started in the 1960s, and the rise in the 
number of Supreme Court opinions, which occurred much earlier and then 
subsequently decreased. The data presented in Figure 3 show a growth in Supreme 
Court cases following the Civil War and a decrease in opinions by the time of the Stone 
Court (1941-45). 
 
                                                
183 Thomas Walker, et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States 
Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362 (1988). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 364-65. 
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The data suggest that the change in the number of opinions issued is inversely 
related to the number of dissenting opinions. The five-fold increase in Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1860’s was not accompanied by an increase in dissenting opinions. By 
contrast, the drop in the number of Supreme Court cases following the Judiciary Act of 
1925 corresponds well with the increase in dissenting opinions. In addition, the 
Rehnquist Court heard fewer cases per year than any Court of the last 100 years, but 
nearly 50 percent of all opinions had a dissent; the Roberts Court appears to be 
following a similar pattern. This inverse relation suggests that it was more likely the 
change in the type of cases that resulted in more dissenting opinions rather than the 
change in the number of opinions.  
The authors also briefly considered this possible explanation when they analyzed 
the type of cases heard before the Stone Court and its predecessor, the Hughes Court. 
The authors concluded that there was not a significant increase in the type of cases they 
describe as “dissent prone.” This analysis ignores the fundamental change in the role of 
the Court post-Erie as discussed above. The Court was, by the time of Stone’s 
ascendancy to chief justice, becoming a constitutional court rather than a supreme 
common law court. Certainly the increase in contentious, political cases seen during the 
1940s made for a more fertile ground for dissent. It was at this time that “the cutting 
edge debate [of] constitutional law shifted from . . . economic regulation . . . to claims of 
civil liberties violations on behalf of various kinds of dissidents.”186 The unquestionable 
growth in dissent-prone cases was caused in part by the fact that during this time the 
Court issued a series of cases that extended the protections of the Bill of Rights to state 
law through the Fourteenth Amendment.187 
                                                
186 REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 174-75. 
187 The “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment is a controversial 
constitutional question. In a recent essay, David Strauss notes that the issue “went from being a subject of 
intense controversy--probably the most controversial issue in constitutional law between the mid-1940s 
and mid-1950s, and one of the most controversial for a decade or more thereafter--to being a completely 
settled issue.” See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE 
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But like the possible causes noted above, this explanation cannot be viewed in a 
vacuum. The law and society was in great flux at this time. The rise of New Deal 
constitutionalism replaced the long history of Lochner constitutionalism in the first 
major reversal of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Holmes’s dissent in Lochner was 
vindicated and somewhat revered after it became the law of the land in 1937. Dissent 
proved to be a powerful weapon for change. Furthermore, this time saw the rise of legal 
realism as a counter to the traditional use of natural law. During the majority of 
Supreme Court history, the Court acted as a sort of an Oracle of the Law. In the grand 
formal style, the justices would, through their internal debate, derive the correct answer 
or the “truth” of the law. 
This idea that there was a truth behind the law began to evaporate in legal 
academic circles by the 1920s. Although Holmes in his Lowell Lectures on the common 
law in 1881 argued that many extralegal matters affected the law more than abstract 
logic or natural law, it was not until forty years later that this would become a 
mainstream idea in the legal academy. Coincidentally, the rise of legal realism was 
centered at Yale and Columbia during the late teens and early 1920s when future Chief 
Justice Stone was dean of the Columbia Law School (1910-1923). Stone was educated in, 
and as dean participated in the creation of, a vastly different legal world than known by 
any of his predecessors. The broad social forces that led to the New Deal, the rise of legal 
realism, and the change in the cases heard by the Court greatly contributed to Stone’s 
attitude about law and about how “truth” should be determined.  
By 1941, the Court was also populated with a more diverse (at least intellectually 
diverse) group of justices than at any earlier time. During the 1920’s when Stone 
ascended to the Court, the legal realists and the new process for deciding the law were 
well represented on the Court by Justice Brandeis. Brandeis, like Holmes, was revered 
for his powerful dissents and his passion for change in the law. Dissenting in Gilbert v 
Minnesota, Brandeis first suggested that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment should include civil liberties as well as property rights.188 This period of 
history was a wellspring for change in the law and it was at the Supreme Court that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
L.J. 1717, 1746 (2003). Although the first right to be incorporated, the Takings Clause, occurred in the late 
Nineteenth Century, see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), the 
period around Stone’s tenure saw the greatest activity of incorporation by the Court. See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating freedom of speech clause); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 
(1931) (incorporating freedom of the press clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (incorporating 
right to assistance of counsel in capital criminal cases); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) 
(incorporating freedom of assembly clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating 
free exercise of religion clause); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating 
establishment of religion clause); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating public trial right); Wolf 
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating unreasonable search and seizure clause). The 
incorporation parade paused for a decade or so before resuming in the civil-rights era of the Sixties and 
Seventies. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating right to assistance of counsel in 
all felony cases); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating right to confrontation of adverse 
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy trial); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporating right to compulsory process to obtain witness 
testimony); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating trial by impartial jury); Rabe v. 
Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972) (incorporating notice of accusation). Some rights have not been 
incorporated (yet). See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (addressing right to jury trial in civil cases); 
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (rejecting incorporation of 2nd Amendment).  
188 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
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reformers were able, through the use of reasoning of past dissenting opinions, to achieve 
their revolution.  
Chief Justice Stone admired the practice of dissent and its recent history in the 
Court. He knew the power of Holmes and Brandeis to change the law through dissent, 
and Stone sought to encourage the practice.189 Therefore, compared to earlier chief 
justices who sought compromise above all else, Stone was an ineffective “leader.” His 
conference debates were heated and filled with controversy.190 In them, Stone 
encouraged dissent stating that “[t]he right of dissent is an important one and has 
proved to be such in the history of the Supreme Court . . . I do not think it is the 
appropriate function of a Chief Justice to attempt to dissuade members of the Court 
from dissenting in individual cases.”191 The “history” that Stone was referring to was the 
recent vindication of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner. Stone was a new breed of lawyer in 
control of the law’s most powerful entity during a fundamental change in our 
understanding of legal reasoning. Law was now politics to a great extent, and Stone was 
willing to assert the Supreme Court as a political branch. Stone achieved this revolution 
at the Court by increasing the use of dissenting opinions just as Marshall implemented 
his revolution by introducing the unanimity consensus. As discussed briefly below, the 
means were different, but the ends were the same. 
Stone increased the power of the Court, and thus achieved the same results as 
Marshall, but for different reasons and under different circumstances. Both Marshall 
and Stone were about achieving a more active political role for the Court. To increase 
the power of the Court specifically and the law generally, Stone encouraged debate and 
controversy rather than suppressing it as Marshall was required to do to accomplish the 
same end. Only through the use of dissent could Stone extend the reach of the Court 
from primarily economic matters into the realm of civil liberties.  
It is not necessary to say that Stone knew that increasing tolerance for and 
practice of dissent was likely to have the impact that it did on the Court’s domination of 
controversial public policy questions. The practice here, like that for Marshall, may well 
have been one that seemed natural, reflected the mood of the times, and been merely a 
satisfaction of the preferences of those on the Court. But it is unmistakable when viewed 
in light of the other discursive changes, that these explanations are just the surface or 
“conditions of possibility”(you put quotes around it elsewhere) that undergird the true 
sociological explanation for the practice. 
 Unlike the quick reversion to traditional methods of opinion delivery in England 
and Virginia, after Stone’s brief tenure as chief justice, the unanimity rule was dead for 
good. This was in spite of immediate steps to reverse the trend. To replace Stone as chief 
                                                
189 The most startling example of this power comes from the cases Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In 
Gobitis, Chief Justice Stone dissented from a 8-member majority holding that Jehovah’s Witnesses could 
be expelled from public school for failing to salute the flag during the Pledge of Allegiance. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. at 601-02. In the very next term, five justices were persuaded by Stone’s dissent, and voted to 
overrule Gobitis in a case again involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Pledge. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 
190 David Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme 
Court, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING (PAGE), (PAGE) (Joel Grossman and Richard 
Wells eds., 1980). 
191 ALPHEUS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 608 (1956). 
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justice, President Truman chose Fred Vinson, who was know for his sociable and likable 
personality.  
 
Although Truman admired Vinson’s record . . . his 
personality was the most important factor influencing the 
decision to appoint him . . .. His sociability and friendliness, 
his calm, patient, and relaxed manner, his sense of humor, 
his respect for the views of others, his popularity with the 
representatives of many factions, and his ability to conciliate 
conflicting views and clashing personalities and to work out 
compromises were qualities that Truman admired. Even 
more important, those personal qualities seemed to the 
President to fit the needs of the situation inside the Supreme 
Court. Dissension and dissent were on the rise . . . Vinson 
seemed capable of unifying the Court and thereby improving 
its public image.192 
 
But eight justices were already in place and were all influenced by Stone and the concept 
of legal realism. They were aware too that dissent enabled them to expand their role and 
power over policy issues. Once the genie was out of the bottle it was impossible to put it 
back in.193 Instead of working toward compromise and consensus, the Vinson court 
became known as “nine scorpions in a bottle.”194 
The “failure” of Vinson need not be viewed as a personal failure of leadership. 
The context in which each of these chief justices tried to lead was different for a variety 
of reasons. Even Marshall would not have been able to achieve unanimity in the 
Supreme Court of Vinson’s day. The Vinson Court and the Marshall Court both existed 
during a period of legal revolution. At the time of John Marshall, however, the Court 
and the justices were certain about the role of law. Marshall merely redirected the Court 
toward a more active political role. In fact, it is a natural conclusion of the thesis of this 
paper that if Marshall were chief justice during this time, he would have been 
instrumental in leading the change from unanimity to the dissent norm. In both cases, it 
was the end result—an increased political role for the law and the Court—that was 
important, not the means. 
In contrast to the end of the Marshall Court, during the Stone Court and later 
Courts, the dispute was not only about the political nature of the Court, but the broader 
question of the role of law in society. Achieving unanimity in this context is much more 
difficult and might have the opposite of the desired effect. The justices, despite 
somewhat similar backgrounds, were likely to have different perspectives on diverse 
social issues such as the rights of women, segregation, or abortion. In addition, the 
Court does not act in a political vacuum, and the issuance of a unanimous, per curiam 
opinion “deciding” a particularly thorny issue might provoke an extra-judicial or even 
extra-legal response. 
                                                
192 Richard Kirkendall, Fred M. Vinson, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
1789-1969 2641 (Leon Friedman and Fred Israel eds., 1969). 
193 See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 148 (“Brought in as a mediator, Vinson largely failed in 
this task.”). 
194 ROBERT STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE: LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1986). 
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Justice Frankfurter portended the surge in dissents in one of his first opinions, 
written in 1939. Frankfurter praised the seriatim tradition in England, an odd thing to 
do in a judicial opinion, calling it a “healthy practice”, but noting that the Court’s 
workload prohibited them from doing it in every case.195 He then suggested that the 
Court use the seriatim approach “when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is 
announced after a reconstruction in the membership of the Court.”196 This idea—that all 
justices should be heard from on big questions—originated with Madison, who wrote in 
an 1819 letter: 
 
I could have wished also that the Judges had delivered their opinions seriatim. 
The case was of such magnitude, in the scope given to it, as to call, if any case 
could do so, for the views of the subject separately taken by them. This might 
either by the harmony of their reasoning have produced a greater conviction in 
the Public mind; or by its discordance have impaired the force of the precedent 
now ostensibly supported by a unanimous & perfect concurrence in every 
argument & dictum in the judgment pronounced.197 
 
Frankfurter’s suggestion is notable because it previews both the constitutional 
showdowns to come, as well as the role of dissent (if not seriatim) in giving the Court 
legitimacy to decide these disputes. As Jefferson noted when advocating the writing of 
separate opinions, dissent allows judges in the future to overrule bad law based on the 
reasoning of their predecessors, in essence allowing the court, and thus the law and 
lawyers, to achieve a more political role by essentially mollifying the losing parties and 
encouraging a continuing legal discourse over social issues. Of course, achieving 
unanimity on contentious political issues might have been preferred by the winners ex 
post, but if the issues were too contentious and the opposition too strong to achieve any 
broad consensus, ex ante both sides of the debate would prefer the option value 
imbedded in a world with dissent. And, as discussed below, any consensus would in fact 
undermine the ability of the law to remain the locus for the determination of the truth of 
such questions. Dissent actually allows the Court to continue in its active role post-legal 
realism. 
 
IV. Recent history: To seriatim and back again? 
 
The last 50 years of Supreme Court history since the time of Chief Justice Stone 
has been characterized by a proliferation of dissents.198 During the first 140 years of 
                                                
195 Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
196 Id. 
197 See Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in, THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 18, DOCUMENT 15 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
198 Not only has the number of dissents increased but so has the vitriol. When justices did dissent 
during the Marshall Court, they did so reluctantly and apologetically. This was in part due to the collegial 
atmosphere that existed in the “boardinghouse Court.” Compare several opening sentences from 
dissenting opinions during this period. Those Federalist justices that supported Marshall’s change in 
discourse wrote cautiously when dissenting. See Bank of the United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 90 
(1827) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“I should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ 
from this Court, acquiesce silently in its opinion . . ..”); Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. 370, 379 (1827) 
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Court history dissents appeared in less than seven percent of cases; since that time there 
have been dissenting opinions in over half of all opinions issued by the Supreme 
Court.199 Chief justices from Stone to Rehnquist made no attempt to return to a Court of 
consensus. Chief Justice Rehnquist spoke of dissent in matter-of-fact terms200 and 
Justice William Brennan wrote of dissent as a “duty”.201 Therefore, the dissent norm 
continues to this day.202  
 
A. The modern hybrid approach  
 
Although opinions are still issued as an “opinion of the court” and separate 
opinions are merely concurrences or dissents, the practical effect has been a change 
back to writing separately—back nearly to the tradition of seriatim. For example, in 
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, the decision was announced as follows: 
 
Kennedy, J., announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to a portion of 
Part II-A-1. Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens and Souter, JJ., 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Washington, J. dissenting) (“It has never been my habit to deliver dissenting opinions in cases where it 
has been my misfortune to differ from those which have been pronounced by a majority of this Court.”); 
Drown v. United States., 12 U.S. 110, 129 (1814) (Story, J. dissenting) (“In this case, I have the misfortune 
to differ in opinion from my brethren.”). By contrast the two most frequent dissenters during Marshall’s 
reign Justice Johnson and Justice Livingston, both Jefferson appointees and strongly opposed to 
Marshall’s change to unanimous opinions, did not hesitate to criticize the majority when dissenting. See 
Kirk v. Smith, 22 U.S. 241, 294 (1824) (Johnson, J. dissenting) (“The reasoning upon this cause, must be 
utterly unintelligible to those who hear it….”); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163 (1820) (Livingston, 
J. dissenting) (“In a case affecting life, no apology can be necessary for expressing my dissent from the 
opinion which has just been delivered.”). Even these attacks on the majority pale by comparison to the 
lack of respect shown fellow justices by modern dissenters. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (writing that the majority opinion was “oblivious to our history,” “incoherent,” a 
“jurisprudential disaster,” and “nothing short of ludicrous.”). This type of name calling and hyperbolic 
rhetoric is a far cry from the day when justices rarely had the courage to dissent, and when they did, the 
guilty feelings compelled them to apologize publicly. As Roscoe Pound noted long ago, such vitriolic 
denunciation of other justices is “not good for public respect for courts and law and the administration of 
justice.” Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent 39 ABA JOURNAL 794, 795 
(1953). Although Judge Posner has argued that justices should dissent because dissents play (have played) 
an integral part in the development of law, Posner agrees with Pound that the acerbic dissent is both 
unnecessary and destructive. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 
356-57 (1996). Posner criticizes justices as being more concerned about their individual role and less 
concerned with the institutional role of the Court. In cases that are relatively straightforward, Posner 
agrees with Justice Taft that a definitive rule that may not be perfect or even “correct” is often better than 
an uncertain rule. “In such a case a dissent will communicate a sense of the law’s instability that is 
misleading.” Id. Accusing judges of worrying about their own legacy and ego, Posner writes that “[f]rom 
an institutional perspective it is better for the disagreeing judge not to dissent publicly [in a case which he 
knows will not be reconsidered soon], even though such forbearance will make it more difficult for 
someone to write the judge’s intellectual biography.” Id. at 357. 
199 From 1801 to 1940 (Marshall to Hughes) there were approximately 1231 cases with dissents 
out of a total of approximately 17,811 (~7 percent); from 1941 to 1997 (Stone to Rehnquist) there were 
about 3877 cases with dissents out of a total of approximately 7434 (~52 percent). 
200 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 302-03 (1987). 
201 William J. Brennan Jr. supra note 9 at 437-38 (1986). 
202 In 1995 majority opinions represented 43 percent of all opinions. See POSNER, supra note 193 
at 358 (1996). See also, Figure 3, supra. 
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joined the opinion in full, and Breyer, J., joined except 
insofar as Part II-A-1 relied on an anticompetitive rationale. 
Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., 
joined.203 
 
Dissents, which were once reserved for only the most profound differences of opinion, 
are now downright commonplace.  
There are several reasons why dissenting opinions might be so common today. 
First, there is inertia and custom. Perhaps once the practice is encouraged it is hard to 
stop; dissent becomes the discourse of law and will continue to be so until another 
fundamental shift in power. This tendency to do what the norm is and has been was one 
of the reasons that the age of consensus lasted for almost 100 years after the death of 
Marshall. In a classic defense of dissents, Justice Brennan acknowledged that while a 
justice’s “general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of th[e] court,” he stated that it was a 
“duty” (and not “an egoistic act”) for each justice to dissent.204  
There are also potential political reasons. Vehement dissents signal possible 
political drift of the Court that threatens the stability of the country. The audience for 
these dissents would be other justices (in an attempt to influence them to vote 
differently in the future on similar cases) and/or the public, the press, advocacy groups, 
and thus the Congress (in an attempt to influence the confirmation process). Politically, 
dissents signal to Court stakeholders (i.e., the public, the press, political groups, and the 
Congress) that the Court is wrong or is headed down a dangerous path. In this way, 
dissents can be viewed as a way of marshalling groups to influence the 
appointment/confirmation process. After all, a series of 5-4 decisions increasing the 
power of states vis-à-vis the federal government can all be curtailed or overruled with a 
few appointments by a like-minded president.  
In both cases, dissent is a tool to seize power within the Court. For example, 
consider the justices in the minority on one of the Court’s recent Federalism Cases. The 
justices can acquiesce in the ruling silently as was the tradition for the first century and 
a half of Court history or can alert Court stakeholders about the errors of the decision. 
To do the former creates a perception that the ruling is settled law and that no changes 
in Court personnel will change that result. To do the latter would to exactly the opposite. 
Dissent, especially when it creates a 5-4 decision, weakens the precedents, and thus 
encourages judicial or political responses. Judicially, like-minded lower court judges 
                                                
203 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
204 Brennan, supra note 9 at 437-38. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall were two of the 
Court’s most frequent and famous dissenters. Not only did these two justices significantly add to the 
number of dissenting opinions, but they also introduced a new practice in the Supreme Court—the 
publishing of dissents from petitions filed with the Court. As shown on Figure 6, during the past 30 years 
there were hundreds of dissents from petitions published by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. These 
dissents were occasionally in protest of a denial of certiorari, but the vast majority were dissents from 
denials to review sentences of capital punishment. In each case for death penalty review received by the 
Court, Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall published a dissent that simply stated that in their view 
capital punishment violated the cruel and unusual provision of the 8th Amendment. This practice was in 
plain violation of well-established Court precedent. The justices were making an overtly political 
statement—a statement to the public and to the future.  
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may feel emboldened by the dissents, and attempt to narrow the rulings at the circuit 
level. In addition, dissents communicate to justices in the future (either current or new 
members of the Court), providing them with logic and support for voting to reverse the 
holding. 
Another reason for the continuing use of dissents is the commonly held belief 
that dissents make the law better or make better law. This is based on the power of 
famous and not-so-famous dissents throughout history to shape the Court’s future 
holdings. Think of the success of Holmes’s dissent in Lochner and Harlan’s dissent in 
Plessy.205 As Justice Brennan argued, dissents are offered as a corrective in “the hope 
that the Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case.”206 In addition, like a 
concurrence that directly limits the scope of a particular holding, a dissent allows lower 
courts or future coalitions of justices to carve out an exception to a majority opinion that 
sweeps too broadly. Brennan views these as essential components of judicial 
determination of the “truth.” Therefore, Brennan criticized Justice Marshall as 
“shut[ting] down the marketplace of ideas” when he instituted the consensus norm. This 
marketplace of legal ideas, Justice Brennan argues, is necessary for the creation of 
quality legal decisions. In this way, Justice Brennan sees the publishing of multiple 
opinions as analogous to legal argument within the courtroom. There is a battle of 
justices in legal literature, among judges, and in the forum of public opinion as there is a 
battle of witnesses or experts in the courtroom. 207 
                                                
205 Although the law would be less great without the dissents of Brandeis and Holmes, these 
influential and often graceful expositions of the law as how it should be are by far the exception from the 
mass of pointless dissents. An example of the inefficient use of separate opinions are the opinions of 
Justice Frankfurter. John P. Frank studied the separate opinions of Justice Frankfurter, the most frequent 
concurring justice in the history of the Court. Frank found that Frankfurter’s opinions were almost never 
cited by anyone. See JOHN P. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 126 (1958). 
Frank concluded that this was a waste of energy and talent and led to unnecessary ambiguity and 
uncertainty in the law. Even Justice Holmes, who was known as the “Great Dissenter,” remarked that 
dissents are in most cases “useless and undesirable.” Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 
197, 400 (1904). Therefore, Holmes was want to dissent and discouraged the practice in all but the most 
necessary circumstances. Like the boy who cried wolf, the more one dissents, the less likely dissents are to 
be seriously considered. Familiarity of dissent breeds contempt. 
206 Brennan, supra note 9 at 430. A classic example of this in our era is the dissenting opinion of 
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, in which he 
wrote, that the states’ rights principles he and the other dissenters were advocating were “a principle that 
will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this court.” 469 U.S. 528, 580 
(1985). After the Court’s stunning series of 5-4 decisions over the past decade upholding the rights of 
states against federal interests, Rehnquist has proved to be quite a prognosticator.  
207 Another possible explanation for continued dissents is the rise of the law clerk and the 
expansion of opinions to resemble law review articles. As the length and legal extent of an opinion 
increases, with more and more arguments and footnotes, so too does the grounds for possible 
disagreement among the justices. Finally there is the possibility that modern justices are generally more 
apt to desire individual recognition. Supreme Court justices now have their own jurisprudence that is 
studied in law schools and debated in the legal literature. Furthermore, legal biographies, monographs, 
and speeches are increasingly popular so as to tempt individual justices to create their own legacy of 
judicial opinions. Justice Scalia and Judge Posner both agree that personal recognition is often the 
motivating force behind the trend of frequent dissenting opinions. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting 
Opinion, J. SUPREME COURT HISTORY 33-44 (1994); POSNER, supra note 193 at 356-57 (1996). The power 
of ego should not be underestimated. See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 34 at 141 (commenting on Justice 
Franfurter’s proclivity to write separately, and noting the rise in the judicial ego). Especially when justices 
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But this isn’t the whole story. The criticism of Marshall and the distinction that 
Brennan draws between the current and past practice of dissent is flawed. The Supreme 
Court is a normalizing entity within the larger perspective of modernity: like all other 
forms of modern power, the Court is about the power of domination; the power of 
lawyers and judges and citizens over others—the “govermentalization” of society. The  
current practice of dissent in exactly the same terms and achieving exactly the same 
results as Marshall’s consensus norm—an increase in Court power. To achieve these 
ends for legal power, the Court has adopted various discursive practices throughout its 
history depending on the circumstances of the society at the time. When Marshall took 
control of the Court, there existed a power vacuum at the national level. The consensus 
norm was a way by which the Court could achieve not only power vis-à-vis the other 
branches of government, but also power in the form of “governmentalization.” By 
increasing the authority of the Court, law as an institution was able to intrude into 
previously uncharted territory. Lawyers and judges became more important. The 
discourse of law was forever altered in favor of a greater control of judicial authority 
over other forms of government and more generally the lives of individual citizens. 
At first blush, the rise of the dissenting opinion seems to offer a counterexample 
to this theory of Supreme Court normalization. Published separate opinions allow the 11 
circuit courts and hundreds of lower federal and state courts to offer their own more 
narrow (or broader) interpretation of an opinion. In addition, the dissents allow future 
justices to overrule the opinion and reverse the trend of the law. By generally limiting 
the authority that comes with a 9-0 opinion, dissents seem to undermine the 
normalizing power of the Court. Even Supreme Court justices recognize this impact of 
dissenting opinions. Frequently in controversial cases the Court will go out of its way to 
achieve a unanimous result. For example in the recent case of Clinton v Jones, a highly 
politicized case involving a conflict between the power of the executive and the judiciary, 
the Court achieved a 9-0 majority in order to strengthen the Court’s opinion.208 A 5-4 
opinion with only “conservative” justices in the majority would have been highly 
criticized as a political attempt to undermine the power of the president.209 The result 
instead has been an acceptance that can only come when the Court seems united and 
apolitical.  
Justice Scalia recently wrote about this important role for dissenting opinions. 
Scalia argued that dissenting opinions augment the prestige of individual justices while 
allowing “genuine” unanimity to have great force when most needed.210 As an example 
of when unanimity was “most needed,” Scalia cites to Brown v Board of Education 
when the Supreme Court decided a contentious issue of race relations. Although in 
Brown and Clinton unanimity was necessary to achieve political acceptance, in the 
majority of cases decided today, dissent provides exactly the same result. The argument 
                                                                                                                                                       
are so underpaid relative to what they could earn in the private legal world. Without riches, it is 
understandable that justices seek individual power and fame. 
208 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). In fact this was a 8-0-1 majority in which Justice Breyer 
concurred with the majority. However, Justice Breyer’s opinion reads more like a dissent. Breyer probably 
joined the majority primarily to achieve unanimity, while writing separately in order to undercut the 
majority opinion (?) or to offer future Supreme Court justices an antiprecedent, or to offer lower court 
judges an escape hatch around the decision. 
209 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (reserving, 5-4, the recount of the ballots in the 
2000 presidential election by the Florida Supreme Court).  
210 See Scalia, supra note 207 at 33-44 (1994). 
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is that the practice of dissent provides the Court as an institution with a public and 
political acceptance it would be unable to achieve with per curiam opinions. 
This is related to the point Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes made about what 
is needed to “sustain the court in public confidence”.211 Part of this is revealing the 
deliberative nature of the Court’s decision making process. Kevin Stack argues that the 
“Supreme Court’s legitimacy depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments 
through a deliberative process.”212 Decision making at the Court is secret. Only the nine 
justices attend the conference of justices and the circulation of draft opinions is kept 
hidden from public view. Stack writes that given the secrecy of the Supreme Court 
process for deciding cases, “dissent is necessary to expose the deliberative character of 
the Court’s decisionmaking.”213 
In Stack’s view, majorities, concurrences, and dissents published in the US 
Reports are a published version of the behind-the-scenes debate in the Supreme Court 
conference room; and this public airing of the deliberative process lends political 
legitimacy to the institution of the Court. This argument also cuts to the heart of 
Jefferson’s criticism of opinions of the court. Jefferson encouraged the use of seriatim 
opinions in order to expose each justice to public view, so that they would have the 
incentive to consider and reason each case. With individual opinions, justices expose 
their competence and legal analysis to the world for criticism. In this way, dissenting 
opinions arguably create better justices. With their reputation or career on the line 
justices have the proper incentives to consider the case properly. 
But this account is not complete. Dissent is not just about modernity’s quest for 
deliberative democracy or necessary for the proper functioning of a supreme court, but 
also about the type of law being practiced before the Court. Dissent is not only necessary 
to ensure the legitimacy of the Court, but gives law the authority to resolve controversial 
social issues—it ensures a particular type of Court legitimacy. Just as the opinion of the 
court was necessary to increase the power of the Court during the Marshall era, dissent 
is the strategy that enables the Court and the law in general to maintain its institutional 
position of power and normalization given the highly political nature of the cases the 
Court decides today. Dissent ensures legal control over society just as the unanimity 
norm was necessary to achieve the same result given the context of the early Nineteenth 
century. In this light, unanimity and dissent are means to achieve the same ends—
increased power and a greater role of normalization for courts and lawyers. 
In order to test this hypothesis, let us compare the origin of unanimity and the 
origin of modern dissent. Despite the long history of openness in the judicial process, 
Lord Mansfield instituted a change to unanimity in order to achieve greater legal control 
over the commercial law. Chief Justice Marshall seized upon this same power to 
increase the reach of the judiciary into new realms. This extension was not simply a 
greater centralization of power, but also an increase in establishment of broad norms 
and the enabling force behind modernity’s juridical monarchy. For one hundred years, 
the unanimity consensus existed in part because of this purpose, but the inertia of 
institutional processes and the culture of the legal profession also perpetuated the norm. 
During this time, the Supreme Court was deciding similar types of cases. On common 
                                                
211 HUGHES, supra note 12 at 67-68 (1928). 
212 Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2236 
(1996). 
213 Id. at 2246. 
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law and primarily economic matters, the Court was generally accepted as legitimate 
despite the secrecy of its process. 
But then, in the early 1940s the conditions of possibility were such that a 
departure from the consensus norm was necessary. The origin of law evolved from 
natural law to legal realism—politics entered the law explicitly for the first time. But 
legal realism was a symptom of a broader change in society. Issues never before 
considered as properly before the Court were thrust into the discourse of law. This 
change precipitated a crisis for law and the Court. 
How is it possible to address these often highly political subjects without losing 
the integrity of the Court? The partial answer is dissent. Separate opinions not only 
show society that the process of decision making is legitimate, but also allow those who 
oppose a particular result to take comfort that the result may someday be reversed and 
written in a law that they would support. This is Brennan’s idea of dissent as a corrective 
force. The corrective force of dissents is a two-way street. Both good and bad law are 
subject to the force depending on the prevailing political attitude of the Court. Dissents 
therefore preserve the ability of the Court to maintain its normalizing power. The 
vulnerability of precedents based on less than a unanimous verdict makes the Court and 
the Law invulnerable. 
Imagine a per curiam opinion that overruled all affirmative action programs or 
established a constitutional right to an abortion. Such an opinion would be criticized in 
part because of Stack’s notion of legitimacy, but also because opponents of the opinion 
would have no legal grounds to continue the fight. A unanimous opinion is so strong as 
to be susceptible only to constitutional amendment or impeachment of individual 
justices, both of which are unlikely.214 By contrast, dissent allows lower courts, lawyers, 
and politicians, to measure the weight of the opinion and to plan a political or legal 
counterattack. Dissents lead to ambiguity and hope of change, both of which are fertile 
ground for legal fights and more lawyers. Litigation strategy often depends on the 
strength of precedents or the voting records of the current occupants of the Court. 
Without such possibilities for counterattack, the opinion would carry more weight, but 
the integrity of law and the Court might well come under siege from more dangerous 
from political forces. Possible political reactions are impeachment, change in Court 
composition or jurisdiction,215 or a constitutional amendment. Congress’ power is robust 
here, as the Constitution grants it the “power to decide how much appellate jurisdiction, 
and of what sort, the Supreme Court would enjoy.”216 
                                                
214 Jefferson wrote about how difficult impeachment would be, and how this interplays with 
judicial discourse. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON MEMORIAL EDITION 114 (Lipscomb and Bergh, eds., 1903-04). ("I . . . [am] against caucusing 
judicial decisions, and for requiring judges to give their opinions seriatim, every man for himself, with his 
reasons and authorities at large, to be entered of record in his own words. A regard for reputation, and the 
judgment of the world, may sometimes be felt where conscience is dormant, or indolence inexcitable. 
Experience has proved that impeachment in our forms is completely inefficient."); see also Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1904-05 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed.) (“For experience has already shown that the impeachment it has provided is not even a scarecrow . . 
..”). 
215 See infra note 164. 
216 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 142. 
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For example, Robert Bork, Patrick Buchanan, and other political activists, have 
argued that the Congress should be able to reverse Supreme Court decisions by vote.217 
The “legislative veto” is not as odd as it sounds, having been used in England and in 
colonial America. In fact, the constitutions of states such as New York, New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and others granted the power to review supreme court 
decisions to the legislative, executive, or some combination thereof.218 The 
Bork/Buchanan proposal did not garner serious support, despite the outrage at many 
Court decisions such as Roe v Wade, perhaps in part because of the practice of dissent 
leaves open the opportunity for new rules tomorrow. Dissent undermines the force of 
the opinion and allows opponents to hope for the day when they will control the Court. 
Paradoxically by undermining the authority of the Court, dissent increases the power of 
the Court and the law by insulating it from attacks like those of Bork and Buchanan.219  
For another example of a political attack on the Court, consider the state of 
Georgia’s response to the Court’s opinion in Chisholm. Although the tactic of reversing a 
specific opinion with a constitutional amendment has been used only twice in Supreme 
Court history,220 this may be attributable in part to the fact that the losing parties before 
the Court may find sufficient solace in the power of dissenting opinions to achieve 
similar ends.  
Because it is extremely difficult to amend the Constitution, those opposed to 
particular decisions may try to use the courts to achieve their ends. Take the example of 
abortion. After the decision in Roe the question of abortion was no more resolved than it 
had been prior to the Court’s opinion. However, after Roe not only was abortion lawful, 
but the issue of abortion was “lawyerized” or “judicialized”. The locus of the dispute was 
now the legal system and all its components of domination. Protests now moved from 
the statehouse to the Supreme Court and those opposed to abortion seized upon the 
dissenting opinions and the hope of a change in Court reasoning or personnel to win 
their battle for the “truth.” Dissent keeps potentially extrajudicial subjects such as 
                                                
217 For example, Bork proposed congressional review of Supreme Court decisions or curtailing the 
scope of judicial review. See Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, 67 FIRST THINGS 21, 21 (1996). Bork 
argued that "[t]he most important moral, political and cultural decisions affecting our lives are steadily 
being removed from democratic control,” and that a “change in our institutional arrangements” is the only 
thing that “can halt the transformation of our society and culture by judges.” Id. His solution: “Decisions 
of courts might be made subject to modification or reversal by majority vote of the Senate and the House 
of Representatives. Alternatively, courts might be deprived of the power of constitutional review.” Id. This 
point of view is a departure for Bork, who argued previously that a veto over the Supreme Court was 
dangerous because if could be use destructively as well to overturn the “Court’s essential work.” See 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 55 (1997) (“If two-
thirds of the Senate might have overruled Dred Scott, then perhaps it is imaginable that two-thirds might 
have overruled a case like Brown v. Board of Education. That depends on the passions of the moment, 
but is obvious that unpopular rulings may be easily overturned as improper ones. There is, after all, no 
reason to think that over time the Senate will be a more responsible interpreter of the Constitution than 
the Court.”). 
218 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 20 at 139-40. The final state to move away from this system was 
Rhode Island, which abandoned the practice by 1860. Id. 
219 See also Robert F. Nagel, The High (and Mighty) Court, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30, 2000 
(disparaging the current role of the Court in deciding cases such as partial-birth abortion and school 
prayer, and arguing that the “basic purpose of contemporary judicial activism is to maintain the 
institutional prestige of the federal judiciary.”). 
220 The 11th Amendment—Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793); and the 16th Amendment—
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).  
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abortion and affirmative action within the purview of the law courts, in just the same 
way that Mansfield brought commercial disputes into the ambit of the common law. 
 
B. The Roberts gambit? 
 
A fourth potential discursive change is afoot. At his confirmation hearings, Chief 
Justice Roberts expressed a narrow conception of the role of the Court in public policy 
matters. Using a baseball analogy, Roberts defined the Supreme Court’s role as simply 
“calling balls and strikes”, rather than deciding the fundamental rules of the game. He 
distinguished himself from politically like-minded justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas, by proffering himself as, to use Cass Sunstein’s terms, a “minimalist” rather 
than a Scalia or Thomas-like “visionary”. Some doubt the seriousness of this claim, the 
theoretical possibility of its existence, or its application to practice in the first two terms 
of the Roberts Court, but Roberts has stated publicly that he affirmatively wants the 
Court to return to a Marshall-like consensus norm. Critics object to his proposed reform 
of discourse. Geoffrey Stone recently opined that Supreme Court opinions are not about 
deciding outcomes but announcing legal principles that will give guidance to lower 
courts, police, citizens, and so on—they are the creators of legal truth grids, and small or 
narrow grids are unhelpful. Stone writes:  
 
Whenever the Supreme Court decides a case “narrowly,” resolving only the 
particular dispute before it, it leaves the rest of the society and rest of the legal 
system in the dark. When the Supreme Court leaves important issues unresolved, 
everyone else must guess about what they can and cannot do under the law. 
Lower courts are free to disagree with one other, with the result that the scope of 
constitutional rights will vary randomly from state to state and district to district 
throughout the nation. Unnecessary uncertainty is not a healthy state of affairs 
when it comes to the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion, or the right of 
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. It may be 
easier for the Court to decide cases “narrowly,” but it creates chaos for everyone 
else in the system.221 
 
Stone also echoes Jefferson. He writes that opinions without dissent are an 
“abdication” of judicial responsibility to expose judicial decision making to public 
critique: “The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests largely on the responsibility of 
judges to explain and justify their decisions in opinions that can be publicly read, 
analyzed, and criticized.” Consensus decisions that paper over differences do not do this. 
Here we see Jefferson’s arguments about transparency and accountability. Stone also 
believes dissent is essential to overruling bad law, and he, like Jefferson, cites examples 
of cases in which results we think are right were first suggested in earlier dissents.222 
                                                
221 Geoffrey Stone, Chief Justice Roberts and the Role of the Supreme Court, The [University of 
Chicago] Faculty Blog (Feb. 2, 2007), available at 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/02/chief_justice_r.html#more. 
222 Id. (“It is also important to note that some of the most influential opinions in the history of the 
Supreme Court were concurring and dissenting opinions. Although they did not command the support a 
majority of the Justices at the time, the eventually won the day because of the force of their reasoning. 
Familiar examples, to name just a few, include Justice Harlan’s famous dissenting opinion in Plessy v. 
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Squelching dissent would “degrade the quality of the Court’s work and undermine the 
public’s and the legal profession’s ability to evaluate the seriousness and persuasiveness 
of the Court’s reasoning. In the long run, it would undermine the Court itself.”223 
Although Jefferson and Professor Stone make the same arguments about the 
value of dissent, remember that Jefferson wanted to decrease the power of the Court, 
while presumably Professor Stone wants to increase it or, at least, keep it the same. This 
exposes these arguments, as well as the arguments of their opponents—Marshall and 
Roberts respectively—for what they are: justifications for a particular political role for 
the Court. The critiques are instrumental only. Neither Jefferson nor Stone believe that 
dissent makes better law in the abstract, but rather that separate opinions from that of 
the Court were necessary for an expression of their particular preference for the locus of 
legal power. Jefferson wanted a weak Court so power could be located in the legislature, 
presidency, and the states, and dissent was the means to weaken the Court given its 
institutional position at the time. Stone wants a strong Court and dissent appears to be 
the means to strengthen the Court at this time. 
To put it another way, taking Chief Justice Roberts at his word, the preference for 
unanimity does not obviously sit well with the current stable of cases and the main 
argument of this paper—it seems implausible to suggest that Roberts can achieve 
unanimity on questions of race, gender, school choice, homosexual rights, the War on 
Terror, and other politically contentious issues. So what is his rhetoric about? One 
possibility that is consistent with the theme of this paper, is that Roberts wants to 
decrease the power of the Court in American society, and his mechanism for that is 
same as that used by Mansfield, Marshall, and Stone, just in the opposite direction. 
While his predecessors used a change in opinion-delivery practices to increase the 
power of the Court over issues of the day, Roberts may be advocating a discursive 
change to decrease this power. In all cases, discourse reflects power in same way that 
form follows function.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It is not surprising that we observe opinion-delivery practices of Anglo American 
courts suited to the particular times. This fact seems almost self evident, but it does 
rebut claims that the current practice of writing separately is theoretically and ceteris 
paribus superior to other methods. The lesson from history is that allowing or 
forbidding dissent is not about getting better law per se, but about achieving some 
defined role for courts. This role is typically more power over disputes.  
We have seen that the history of debates about the opinion delivery practices of 
Anglo-American courts has been about court power. Those arguing for the right to 
dissent have sometimes been about limiting court power (e.g., Jefferson) and sometimes 
about increasing it (e.g., Brennan). We should view the proposal from Chief Justice 
Roberts in this light. Roberts’s nostalgia for the Marshall era of unanimity is about 
reducing the power of the Court, both by narrowing individual holdings to open up 
decision space for other courts, and also to limit the kind of cases the Court hears. A 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ferguson, the pivotal dissenting and concurring opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in a series of 
free speech decisions following World War I, and Justice Robert Jackson’s landmark concurring opinion 
in the Steel Seizure case.”). 
223 Id. 
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consensus norm is incompatible with deciding the Court’s recent docket of cases, at least 
in the broad manner in which they have historically been decided. In this day and age, 
narrowness and minimalism go hand in hand with consensus, while breadth and judicial 
power go hand in hand with dissent. Of course, as this paper has shown, it was not 
always this way, and it may not be again. This pattern of punctuated equilibrium is 
bound repeat itself again and again. Dissent is a powerful tool of the law. And because it 
is a tool, dissent is used to achieve the ends of the law, whatever they may be. 
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Appendix 
 
Case Cite Year Justice Appointed By: 
Head & Amory v Providence Insurance Co 6 US 127 1804 Chase Washington 
Ex Parte Bollman 8 US 75 1807 Johnson Jefferson 
Hudson v Guestier 8 US 293 1808 Chase & Livingston Washington / Jefferson 
Higginson v Mein 8 US 415 1808 Livingston Jefferson 
Croudson v Leonard 8 US 434 1808 Chase & Livingston Washington / Jefferson 
Pierce v Turner 9 US 154 1809 Johnson Jefferson 
Fletcher v Peck 10 US 87 1810 Johnson Jefferson 
Fairfax's Devisee v Hunter's Lessee 11 US 603 1812 Johnson Jefferson 
Schooner Paulina's Cargo v US 11 US 52 1812 Johnson Jefferson 
Mima Quan & Child v Hepburn 11 US 290 1813 Duvall Madison 
Herbert v Wren 11 US 370 1813 Johnson Jefferson 
Mills v Duryee 11 US 481 1813 Johnson Jefferson 
The Merrimack 12 US 317 1814 Story Madison 
The Frances 12 US 418 1814 Livingston Jefferson 
The Venus 12 US 253 1814 Marshall Adams 
Drown v US  12 US 110 1814 Story Madison 
Speake v US 13 US 28 1815 Livingston Jefferson 
The Brig Short Staple & Cargo v US 13 US 55 1815 Story Madison 
The Edward Scott 14 US 261 1816 Livingston Jefferson 
Mutual Assurance Society v Watts 14 US 279 1816 Livingston & Story Jefferson / Madison 
Shipp v Miller's 15 US 316 1817 Marshall Adams 
The Aeolus 16 US 392 1818 Johnson Jefferson 
US v Smith 18 US 153 1820 Livingston Jefferson 
Blake v Doherty 18 US 359 1820 Johnson Jefferson 
Evans v Eaton 20 US 356 1822 Livingston Jefferson 
The Luminary 21 US 407 1823 Johnson Jefferson 
Kirk v Smith 22 US 241 1824 Johnson Jefferson 
Mason v Haile 25 US 370 1827 Washington Adams 
Bank of the US v Dandridge 25 US 64 1827 Marshall Adams 
Brown v Maryland 25 US 419 1827 Thompson Monroe 
Minor v Mechanics Bank of Alexandria 26 US 46 1828 Johnson Jefferson 
Doe v Grymes 26 US 469 1828 Johnson Jefferson 
Sundry African Slaves v Mardazo 26 US 110 1828 Johnson Jefferson 
Weston v City Council of Charleston 27 US 449 1829 Johnson Jefferson 
Finlay v William King's Lessee 28 US 346 1830 Johnson Jefferson 
Shanks v DuPont 28 US 242 1830 Johnson Jefferson 
Patapsco Insurance Co v Coulter 28 US 222 1830 Thompson & Baldwin Monroe / Jackson 
Parsons v Bedford 28 US 433 1830 McLean Jackson 
Ex Parte Crane 30 US 190 1831 Baldwin Jackson 
US v Robertson 30 US 641 1831 Baldwin Jackson 
Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US 1  1831 Thompson Monroe 
Winship v Bank of the US 30 US 529 1831 Baldwin Jackson 
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Fisher v Cockerell 30 US 248 1831 Baldwin Jackson 
Page v Lloyd 30 US 304 1831 Johnson Jefferson 
Doe v Winn 30 US 233 1831 Johnson Jefferson 
US v Arredondo 31 US 691 1832 Thompson Monroe 
Ex Parte Tobias Watkins 32 US 568 1833 Johnson Jefferson 
Wheaton v Peters 33 US 591 1834 Thompson Monroe 
Harrison v Nixon 34 US 329 1835 Baldwin Jackson 
Beers v Haughton 34 US 329 1835 Thompson Monroe 
US v Bailey 34 US 238 1835 McLean Jackson 
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